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WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY:
WHY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE
OHIO MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
On November 2, 2004, Issue 1, known as the Ohio Marriage
Amendment, passed with 62% of the popular vote. 1 The Amendment
reads:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political
subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design,
qualities, significance or effect of marriage. 2
In the wake of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 3 which
legalized same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, and Baker v. State, 4
which mandated civil unions in Vermont, same-sex marriage
opponents argued that the Ohio Marriage Amendment was necessary
to prevent the march of same-sex marriage and civil unions into the
Midwest. The passage of the Ohio Marriage Amendment achieved
this goal. Unless the Amendment is either repealed or declared
unconstitutional, couples in same-sex marriages and civil unions
cannot receive legal recognition in Ohio. 5
1 OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE ISSUE 1: NOVEMBER 2, 2004 OFFICIAL RESULTS,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2004ElectionsResults/041102Issue1.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
2 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
3 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
5 To date, no state that has adopted a constitutional marriage amendment has decided to
repeal it. However, a district court recently held that California’s marriage amendment violated
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (permanently enjoining the
enforcement of Proposition 8, California’s marriage amendment). The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has stayed the district court’s opinion pending appeal. Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010).
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Despite the certainty the Amendment brought to same-sex
marriages and civil unions, the fate of Ohio’s domestic partnership
registries and benefits programs is in legal limbo. David R. Langdon
is the author of the Ohio Marriage Amendment and serves as counsel
to Citizens for Community Values (“CCV”), 6 the main sponsors of
the Amendment. 7 David R. Langdon has also represented the
plaintiffs in all three cases challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s
domestic partnership programs. In Brinkman v. Miami University,8
former Ohio State Representative Tom Brinkman, a close associate of
CCV President Phil Burress, claimed that Miami University’s samesex domestic partnership benefits policy violated the second sentence
of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. 9 In City of Cleveland Heights ex
rel. Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights, 10 former Cleveland Heights
Councilman Jimmie Hicks challenged the constitutionality of
Cleveland Heights’ domestic partner registry under the Ohio Home
Rule Amendment. In Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v.
City of Cleveland, 11 Langdon argued that Ohio’s Home Rule
Amendment and the second sentence of the Marriage Amendment
prohibited the City of Cleveland from maintaining its domestic
6 See Press Release, Citizens for Cmty. Values, City of Cleveland Asked to Cease and
Desist with Domestic Partnership Registry (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.ccv.org/2009
/05/07/city-of-cleveland-asked-to-cease-and-desist-with-domestic-partnership-registry/ (noting
that Langdon was the Ohio Marriage Amendment’s primary author); see also Anthony
Glassman, Judge Calls Brinkman the True Villain, Again, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON. (Aug. 24,
2007), http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories07/aug/0824074.htm (stating that David R.
Langdon is counsel to both CCV and Ohio State Rep. Thomas Brinkman and had advised both
men that they could falsify election petitions); Sarah Sturmon & Sharon Moloney, Family PAC
Is Stressing Moral Issues, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 14, 1997, at 8A (stating that David R.
Langdon is counsel to CCV).
7 See Brief for Citizens for Community Values as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, State
v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2006-0151) (detailing CCV’s sponsorship of
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment); see also C. Susie Lorden, The Law of Unintended
Consequences: The Far-Reaching Effects of Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendments, 25
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 211, 222–23 (2006) (chronicling CCV’s sponsorship of the Ohio Marriage
Amendment and arguing that CCV intended to attack gays and lesbians through the
Amendment).
8 No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007).
9 Id. at *1. Prior to suing Miami University over its same-sex domestic partnership
program, former State Representative Brinkman also served as an intervening defendant in
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th
Cir. 1997) (holding that a Cincinnati charter amendment prohibiting gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals from receiving antidiscrimination protection did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Equal Rights, Not Special Rights (“ERNSR”) was
another intervening defendant in this case. Id. at 289. Phil Burress, the head of CCV, which
sponsored Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, is also the head of ERNSR. See Glassman, supra note
6 (stating that Burress is the leader of both ERNSR and CCV).
10 832 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
11 No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010).
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partner registry. Although the courts in all three of these cases held in
favor of the defendants, 12 this area of Ohio law is not yet settled. 13
This Note asserts that the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage
Amendment is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of arguing that Ohio’s domestic
partnership registries and benefits programs are compatible with the
Ohio Marriage Amendment, which may very well be the case, 14 this
Note argues that the second sentence of the Marriage Amendment is a
sophisticated form of discrimination specifically targeting gays and
lesbians, and not, as the Amendment’s text states, “unmarried
individuals.”
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I lays out the litigation
inspired by the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Part II explains the
differences between civil unions and domestic partnership programs
across the country and in Ohio. Part III provides a brief survey of
state marriage amendments. Part IV discusses United States Supreme
Court precedent concerning LGBT rights and equal protection
analysis in cases with facially neutral laws. In the first half of this
section, this Note looks at the impact of Romer v. Evans 15 and
Lawrence v. Texas, 16 two landmark cases that address LGBT legal
issues. The second half of this section discusses Washington v.
Davis, 17 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
12 See Cleveland Taxpayers, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981, at *16, 24 (holding that
Cleveland’s domestic partner registry ordinance did not violate the Ohio Marriage Amendment);
Brinkman, 2007 WL 2410390, at *13 (rejecting a challenge to Miami University’s policy of
providing employee health benefits for same-sex partners because the party bringing the
challenge lacked standing); Hicks, 832 N.E.2d at 1277–78 (upholding a domestic partner
registry ordinance because it was within the municipality’s home rule powers to enact the
ordinance).
13 See infra Part I (discussing case law arising from the enactment of the Ohio Marriage
Amendment).
14 See Cleveland Taxpayers, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981, at *16 (“[W]e find that
Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry ordinance does not violate [Ohio’s] Marriage
Amendment.” (citation omitted)); see also Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and
Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW
& INEQ. 59, 84 (2007) (“Just as [Ohio’s Marriage Amendment] does not preclude the state from
treating an unmarried person like a spouse in any respect, the amendment does not preclude the
state from treating an unmarried person like a spouse in any particular respect, e.g., from
enjoying benefits traditionally associated with marriage.”).
15 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited
gays and lesbians from receiving the protection of existing antidiscrimination laws or from
creating new antidiscrimination laws, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
16 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that Texas’s anti-same-sex-sodomy law violated
a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld Georgia’s anti-sodomy law).
17 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (holding that a police recruitment test that had a
discriminatory impact against blacks was nevertheless constitutional because the test was not
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Development Corp., 18 and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,19 three
cases where the Supreme Court analyzed facially neutral laws that
had a disproportionate impact upon either racial minorities or women.
In these cases, the Supreme Court held that a facially neutral law
would be unconstitutional only if 1) the law had a disproportionate
impact on an unnamed group and 2) the law was always intended to
harm that unnamed group. Although the Supreme Court upheld the
challenged laws in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney, these cases
laid the groundwork for a finding that the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment is unconstitutional.
Part V argues that the removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership
registries and benefits programs would have a disparate impact on
gays and lesbians. This section establishes that same-sex couples
make up the majority of the couples in Ohio’s domestic partnership
registries and public health benefits programs.
Part VI argues that Ohio’s Marriage Amendment was always
intended to disproportionately impact same-sex couples, and not just
unmarried individuals. This conclusion is supported under three
different theories. First, Section A argues that attacks against
domestic partnership programs, even those that are gender-neutral,
inherently target gays and lesbians. To accomplish this objective, this
Note analyzes the history of domestic partnership programs in the
United States and Ohio, and determines that the primary purpose of
these programs is to benefit gays and lesbians who are prohibited
from marrying. Therefore, campaigns against domestic partnership
programs are necessarily campaigns against these programs’ intended
beneficiaries: same-sex couples.
Second, Section B of Part VI contends that CCV and the Ohio
Campaign to Protect Marriage (“OCPM”), a political action
committee controlled by CCV, misled Ohio voters about the
Amendment’s scope and abused Ohio’s ballot initiative process.
Section B is comprised of three subsections. The first subsection
chronicles the vulnerabilities and criticisms of the ballot initiative
process, namely that

adopted with a discriminatory intent).
18 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977) (holding that a village did not unconstitutionally
discriminate against minorities when it refused to rezone a parcel of land necessary for the
development of a mostly minority housing project).
19 442 U.S. 256, 279–81 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts statute giving absolute
preference to veterans in civil service jobs did not discriminate against women or violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
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1) the Founding Fathers disapproved of direct democracy
because it facilitated a tyranny of the majority;
2) ballot initiatives, particularly when they concern the rights
of minorities, are often created by special interest groups who
wish to circumvent the checks and balances of representative
democracy; and
3) ballot initiative proponents, who are not held politically
accountable through elections, often try to confuse and
manipulate voters into passing otherwise obtuse and
ambiguous legislation.
The second subsection establishes that CCV bears animus towards
gays and lesbians and openly advocates for state-sponsored
discrimination against Ohio’s LGBT community. Although CCV
claims it is not “against” same-sex couples, this Note shows that CCV
advocated the same opinions against gays and lesbians as Colorado
for Family Values (“CFV”), the sponsors of Colorado’s animusdriven Amendment 2.
The third subsection uses CCV’s own advertisements and
statements to show that it confused and manipulated the public over
Issue 1’s impact. Specifically, this Note demonstrates that CCV
always intended to attack Ohio’s domestic partnership programs with
the Marriage Amendment, but that CCV never divulged this intent in
its advertisements. Moreover, CCV’s advertisements either confused
voters about the fate of Ohio’s domestic partnership programs, or
explicitly asserted that Issue 1 would not affect these institutions.
Finally, Section C of Part VI argues that if Ohio’s public domestic
partnership programs are ever declared unconstitutional, then the
effects of this decision would be so broad and harmful to Ohio’s
LGBT community that the second sentence of the Marriage
Amendment would automatically betray an intentional, and
unconstitutional, antigay animus. If Ohio’s domestic partnership
programs are invalidated under the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment, then all of Ohio’s public institutions would be
prohibited from recognizing same-sex couples, even down to the
municipal level. This end result would have significant consequences
for same-sex couples, forcing the State to treat them as legal pariahs.
This total prohibition of same-sex-couple recognition would prove
that the Ohio Marriage Amendment contains antigay animus because
1) under Lawrence, gays and lesbians have a Fourteenth Amendment
right to form same-sex couples, 2) same-sex couples can never leave
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the “unmarried class” under Ohio law, and 3) under Romer, such
broad and far reaching effects against gays and lesbians throughout
the entire State of Ohio cannot be a legitimate governmental interest.
Part VII concludes that because the invalidation of Ohio’s
domestic partnership programs would disproportionately impact
same-sex couples, and because the purpose of the second sentence of
the Ohio Marriage Amendment is to harm Ohio’s LGBT community,
the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment must violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. LITIGATION RESULTING FROM THE OHIO MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
Shortly after Ohio adopted its Marriage Amendment in 2004, the
legality of Ohio’s domestic violence statute, 20 domestic partnership
benefits programs, 21 and domestic partnership registries were thrown
into doubt. 22 In 2005, a trial court in State v. Burk 23 declared that
Ohio’s domestic violence law, which grants domestic violence
protection to “a person living as a spouse,” 24 violated the second
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. 25 Although this decision
was later reversed at the appellate level, 26 it opened the floodgates for
similar litigation and caused a split amongst Ohio’s appellate courts. 27
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (West 2010). Compare State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d
1076, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a provision in Ohio’s domestic violence statute
that extended protection to “a person living as a spouse” violated Ohio’s Marriage Amendment),
rev’d sub nom. In re Ohio Domestic-Violence Statute Cases, 872 N.E.2d 1212, 1212–13 (Ohio
2007) (reversing all pending appeals in conflict with State v. Carswell, 817 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio
2007), which held that Ohio’s domestic violence statute did not violate Ohio’s Marriage
Amendment), with State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
Ohio’s domestic violence statute did not violate Ohio’s Marriage Amendment).
21 See Brinkman v. Miami Univ., No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 27, 2007) (determining whether Miami University, a public institution, had a same-sex
domestic partner benefits program that violated the Ohio Marriage Amendment).
22 See Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, No. 94327, 2010
Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (determining whether Cleveland’s
domestic partnership registry violated Ohio’s Marriage and Home Rule Amendments); City of
Cleveland Heights ex rel Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights, 832 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App.
2007) (determining whether the City of Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry
violated the Ohio Home Rule Amendment).
23 No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d 843
N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i) (West 2010).
25 Burk, 2005 WL 786212, at *8 (holding that the Ohio domestic violence statute violated
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment “insofar as it recognizes as a ‘family or household member’ a
person who is not married to the offender but is ‘living as a spouse’”).
26 State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254, 1256–59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the
constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic violence statute).
27 See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Voies, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 23, 2006) (overturning lower court’s judgment that the Ohio domestic violence
statute violated the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment); State v. Dixon, No.
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In July 2007, in State v. Carswell, 28 the Supreme Court of Ohio
resolved the split and held that Ohio’s domestic violence statute did
not violate the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. 29
In coming to its conclusion, the Court announced that “the second
sentence of the amendment means the state cannot create or recognize
a legal status for unmarried persons that bears all of the attributes of
marriage—a marriage substitute.” 30 Despite the boldness of this
declaration, which appears to protect Ohio’s domestic partnership
programs and limit the scope of the Amendment’s second sentence
only to “marriage substitutes,” there is cause for concern among
Ohio’s gay-rights activists.
First, in Carswell, the Court indicated in a footnote that Ohio’s
domestic partnership benefits programs might violate the Marriage
Amendment. 31 Citing Ohio Revised Code Section 3101.01(C)(3), the
Court
noted,
“regarding
benefits
for
government
employees . . . benefits for marriage partners should not be conferred
upon individuals cohabiting out of wedlock, whatever their gender.” 32
Second, the Supreme Court of Ohio has the power to find that
Ohio’s domestic partnership programs violate the Ohio
Constitution. 33 To that end, other state supreme courts have been

2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110, at *4 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005) (holding that Ohio’s
domestic violence statute violated the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment); see
also Lorden, supra note 7, at 233–36 (listing the challenges to Ohio’s domestic violence
statute).
28 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007).
29 Id. at 554.
30 Id. at 551.
31 See id. at 551 n.1 (describing the intent of the Ohio Marriage Amendment).
32 Id. at 551–52 n.1. However, this argument can be countered by carefully reading Ohio
Revised Code Section 3101.01(C)(3)(a) and (b), which states:
Nothing in division (C)(3) of this section shall be construed to do either of the
following:
(a) Prohibit the extension of specific benefits otherwise enjoyed by all persons,
married or unmarried, to nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or
different sexes, including the extension of benefits conferred by any statute that is
not expressly limited to married persons, which includes but is not limited to benefits
available under Chapter 4117[] of the Revised Code;
(b) Affect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid under the
laws of this state.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(3)(a)–(b) (West 2010). There is no Ohio law stating that
employer-provided health insurance is a right or benefit limited only to married couples.
33
See Carswell, 871 N.E.2d at 549-50 (noting that although statutes are presumed to be
constitutional, the Ohio Supreme Court has the authority to ultimately declare a statute
unconstitutional).
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ruling on the constitutionality of domestic partnership programs under
their own state constitutions. For example, in 2008, the Supreme
Court of Michigan in National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of
Michigan 34 broadly interpreted the Michigan Marriage Amendment,
which is very similar to the Ohio Marriage Amendment and was
likewise adopted via ballot initiative in 2004. 35 The Supreme Court of
Michigan held that the state could not grant health insurance benefits
to the same-sex partners of gay employees. 36 Additionally, Wisconsin
courts are currently hearing a challenge to the state’s domestic
partnership registry. Wisconsin Family Action, the proponents of the
Wisconsin Marriage Amendment and plaintiffs to the suit, claim that
the registry violates the second sentence of the Wisconsin Marriage
Amendment. 37 Further, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker has stated
that he believes the domestic partnership registry is unconstitutional;
on May 13, 2011 he filed a motion to stop the state’s defense of its
registry. 38
Finally, as evidenced by the litigation in Brinkman v. Miami
University, 39 City of Cleveland Heights ex rel. Hicks v. City of
Cleveland Heights, 40 and Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution
v. City of Cleveland, 41 Carswell has not stopped CCV, the main
sponsors of the Ohio Marriage Amendment, 42 and David R.
Langdon—author of the Amendment and counsel to CCV 43—from
748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
Id. at 529. Compare OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (“This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.”), with MICH. CONST. art I, § 25 (“[T]he union of one man and one woman in
marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose.”).
36 Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 543. However, public employers in Michigan have
found a way around the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling by augmenting their benefits policies.
Instead of granting health benefits based upon the existence of a relationship between
employees and their partners, certain public employers in Michigan now offer health benefits to
any person who has resided with a public employee for at least one year. See Associated Press,
Michigan Commission OKs Domestic-Partner Benefits, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 27,
2011, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9L0NEBG0.htm.
37 See Scott Bauer, Lawsuit Challenges State’s Domestic Partner Registry, LACROSSE
TRIBUNE, Aug. 19, 2010, http://lacrossetribune.com/news/state-and-regional/wi/article_
cbb1018a-ab0b-11df-8d15-001cc4c002e0.html (discussing the lawsuit challenging Wisconsin’s
domestic partner registry).
38 See Patrick Marley, Walker Seeks to Stop Defense of State’s Domestic Partner Registry,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 16, 2011, http://www.jsonline.mobi/news/statepolitics/
121956273.html.
39 No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007).
40 832 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
41 No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010).
42 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
43 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
34
35
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challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic partnership
registries and benefits programs.
In Brinkman v. Miami University, former Ohio State
Representative Tom Brinkman, with Langdon as his attorney,
challenged the constitutionality of Miami University’s same-sex
domestic partnership benefits program under the Ohio Marriage
Amendment. 44 The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District
dismissed the case because Brinkman lacked standing; 45 the court did
not rule on the merits of Brinkman’s claim or elaborate on the impact
of Carswell, which the Supreme Court of Ohio had decided only one
month prior. 46
In City of Cleveland Heights ex rel. Hicks v. City of Cleveland
Heights, Langdon again served as plaintiff’s counsel in the first case
to challenge the constitutionality of an Ohio domestic partnership
registry. 47 The Eighth District Court of Appeals held that Cleveland
Heights’ registry fell under the protection of the Ohio Home Rule
Amendment, which grants complete authority to Ohio municipalities
in matters of local self-governance. 48
Four years later, in Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v.
City of Cleveland, Langdon represented a new plaintiff, alleging that
Cleveland’s domestic partner registry violated the Ohio Marriage and
Home Rule Amendments. 49 Relying mainly on Hicks, the court
dispatched with the Home Rule argument. 50 Applying Carswell, the
Eighth District upheld the registry’s constitutionality under the
second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment.
According to a unanimous Eighth District Court of Appeals,
Carswell had a simple holding: “any legally established relationship
bearing less than all the attributes of marriage is constitutional.” 51
Since Cleveland’s domestic partner registry did not confer even the
basic legal benefits or responsibilities of marriage, such as the right to
44 2007 WL 2410390 at *1; see also supra note 9 (discussing Brinkman’s relationship
with CCV founder Phil Burress).
45 Brinkman, 2007 WL 2410390 at *13–14.
46 Carswell was decided on July 25, 2007. State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007).
Brinkman was decided on August 27, 2007. Brinkman, 2007 WL 2410390.
47 832 N.E.2d at 1275–77. Although the Marriage Amendment had already been adopted
by the time the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled on Hicks, Langdon’s sole argument in
Hicks was that Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry violated the Home Rule
Amendment of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 1277.
48 Id. at 1278–79.
49 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 at *4.
50 Id. at *18 (“Cleveland’s domestic partner registry ordinance is nearly identical to the
domestic partner registry previously upheld by this court in Hicks. . . . Therefore, like Hicks, we
find that Cleveland’s domestic partner registry is within Cleveland’s home rule authority.”).
51 Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
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inherit intestate or the procedural requirements of divorce, 52 the
registry was not only constitutional, but “in essence, simply a
label.” 53 In reaching this determination, the Eighth District did not
limit its analysis solely to the legal aspects of marriage. According to
the court, its holding also relied on the fact that “the term ‘domestic
partner’ completely lacks the social and emotive resonance of
‘husband’ and ‘wife.’ Domestic partnerships are not given the same
respect by society as a married couple, and they share none of
marriage’s history and traditions.” 54 Thus, without the legal or
societal importance of marriage, the court upheld the constitutionality
of Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry.
Although the future of Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and
benefits programs remain uncertain, for the moment they may
continue to exist.
II. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?: CIVIL UNIONS V. DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIPS V. OHIO’S DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS
There are three kinds of state-created marriage-alternatives: civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and beneficiary programs.
Civil unions are commonly considered “marriage substitutes” 55
and have served as the predecessors to same-sex marriage in three
states: Vermont, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. 56 Only two states
currently issue civil union certificates: New Jersey and Illinois.57
Hawaii and Delaware recently passed civil union legislation and will
Id. at *9–12.
Id. at *12.
54 Id. at *11.
55 See Erin Cleary, Note, New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act in the Aftermath of Lewis
v. Harris: Should New Jersey Expand the Act to Include All Unmarried Cohabitants?, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 519, 523 (2008) (“Civil unions are designed to be virtually identical to
traditional marriages between a man and a woman, but are limited in scope to same-sex
couples.”).
56 Vermont became the first state to adopt civil unions in 2000, and the first state to
legislatively accept same-sex marriage in 2009. See Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont
Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1. In 2005, Connecticut became the first
state to adopt civil unions without the requirement of a court order. See William Yardley,
Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at B5. In 2008, the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407
(2008), declared that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage violated the Connecticut constitution.
New Hampshire is the only state to legislatively accept both civil unions and same-sex marriage,
which it respectively accomplished in 2007 and 2009. See Anthony Faiola, N.H. Is Set to
Approve Same-Sex Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A1; Abby Goodnough, New
Hampshire Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19.
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1–31 (West Supp. 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (2011); see
Monique Garcia, Quinn Signs Historic Civil Union Bill Into Law: Same-Sex Couples Will Get
Many of the Rights as Married Counterparts, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2011, at 6.
52
53
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start granting civil unions on January 1, 2012. 58 With the recent
exceptions of Hawaii and Illinois, civil unions have traditionally been
offered only to same-sex couples. 59 Couples in civil unions typically
enjoy all of the state-level benefits of marriage. 60 But they are not
able to receive the federal benefits of marriage, 61 guaranteed
relationship recognition in other jurisdictions, 62 or considered legally
“married” in any state. 63
In contrast with the relative nationwide consistency of civil unions,
domestic partnerships vary greatly from state to state, both in terms of
benefits offered and eligibility requirements. 64 Washington, 65

58
See B.J. Reyes, Hawaii Now Seventh State to Legalize Civil Unions, HONOLULU STAR
ADVERTISER, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/116776119.html;
Beth Miller, Governor Signs Delaware Civil Unions Bill, USA TODAY, May 12, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-12-delaware-civil-unions_n.htm.
59 In June 2011, Illinois became the first state to offer civil unions to both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. See Garcia, supra note 57. Hawaii will start offering civil unions to samesex and opposite-sex couples in January 2012. See Reyes, supra note 58.
60 See Cleary, supra note 55, at 523.
61 According to the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), “the word ‘marriage’
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”
62 See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“No State . . . shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”).
63 For example, although same-sex couples may enter into civil unions in New Jersey and
receive all the benefits of marriage, New Jersey regards “marriage” as a union reserved for
heterosexual couples. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1–28(f) (West Supp. 2010) (declaring that the
purpose of civil unions is to provide “same-sex couples with the same rights and benefits as
heterosexual couples who choose to marry”).
64 Regardless of how states define “domestic partnerships,” commentators generally
employ similar definitions. The most common definition states that “[d]omestic partnerships are
contracts between two parties asserting that their relationship exhibits the core characteristics of
an intimate association like a marriage.” Ron-Christopher Stamps, Note, Domestic Partnership
Legislation: Recognizing Non-Traditional Families, 19 S.U. L. REV. 441, 451 (1992). The
broadest definition of a domestic partnership “would include any two persons who reside
together and who rely on each other for financial and emotional support . . . [and recognize that]
a sexual relationship is not a requirement, although it may evidence emotional commitment
between the partners.” Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the
Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067,
1069 n.11 (1990).
The larger debate among scholars does not concern itself with the technical definition of
“domestic partnership,” but with the ultimate objective of these institutions. According to Paul
R. Lynd:

A domestic partnership may be seen as (1) a permanent relationship that is an
alternative to marriage and open to any couple, with some or all of the benefits that
are consequent to a lawful marriage; (2) a temporary alternative to marriage for
same-sex couples that fills a gap in marriage laws, but which would be superseded
by lawful marriage if a state ever allows same-sex couples to marry legally; or (3) a
permanent parallel institution existing only for same-sex couples that is essentially a
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Oregon, 66 and Nevada 67 have state-wide domestic partnership
schemes that are nearly identical to civil unions. 68 Of these three
states, however, only Oregon’s domestic partnership program is
strictly limited to same-sex couples. 69 Other states, such as
California, 70 Maine, 71 Wisconsin, 72 and Rhode Island, 73 have a
patchwork quilt of eligibility requirements for their domestic
partnership programs. Further, the rights of domestic partners in these
programs are not equal to the rights of married couples. Also, the
rights these programs offer vary greatly from state to state. For

de facto marriage with many or all of the benefits consequent to a lawful marriage,
but without a marriage license or the designation “marriage” conferred by law.
Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partner Benefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 561, 570 (2000).
65 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.015 (2009) (“The provisions of [this law] shall be liberally
construed to achieve equal treatment . . . of state registered domestic partners and married
spouses.”).
66 OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305(5) (2009) (The Oregon Family Fairness Act extends
“benefits, protections and responsibilities to committed same-sex partners and their children that
are comparable to those provided to married individuals and their children by the laws of this
state”).
67 NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.200(1)(b) (2010) (“[D]omestic partners have the same rights,
protections and benefits, and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations and duties
under law . . . as are granted to and imposed upon . . . spouses.”).
68 Washington’s domestic partnership statute only recently offered rights akin to civil
unions. In 2007, when Washington first began recognizing domestic partnerships, domestic
partners in Washington enjoyed far fewer benefits. Act of Apr. 21, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash.
Legis. Serv. 616. Eventually, Governor Christine Gregoire signed legislation in 2009 expanding
Washington’s domestic partnerships into de facto civil unions. Act of May 18, 2009, ch. 521,
2009 Wash. Legis. Serv. 3065. Same-sex marriage opponents then successfully petitioned to
have this law, popularly nicknamed “Everything but Marriage,” placed on the 2004 state ballot.
See William Yardley, Washington: Same-Sex Partnership Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6 2009, at
A21. On Nov. 4, 2009, Washington voters approved Referendum 71, thereby expanding
Washington’s domestic partnership law. See id.
69 OR. REV. STAT. § 106.310 (2009). In Washington, domestic partnerships are open to all
same-sex couples and to opposite-sex couples where at least one partner is age sixty-two or
older. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.030 (West 2009). In Nevada, a couple may enter into a
domestic partnership regardless of the age or gender of the partners. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 122A.100 (2010).
70 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2010). In California, domestic partnerships are available
to all same-sex couples and to opposite-sex couples where at least one person is age sixty-two or
older. Id.
71 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2010). In Maine, all same-sex and opposite-sex
couples may enter into a domestic partnership regardless of the ages of the partners. Id.
72 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.001 (West 2010). In Wisconsin, only same-sex couples may
enter into a domestic partnership. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.05 (West 2010).
73 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-33.2-24 (2010) (granting domestic partners the right to make
funeral arrangements for one another); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-10 (2010) (granting domestic
partners the right to receive each others’ bodies from state medical examiners).
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example, California, Maine, and Wisconsin allow domestic partners
to inherit intestate,74 but Rhode Island does not. 75
Finally, Hawaii and Colorado offer “beneficiary programs,” which
are merely “domestic partnerships” operating under a different name.
Hawaii has a “reciprocal beneficiaries” program, while Colorado
offers a “designated beneficiaries” program. Both Hawaii and
Colorado’s programs offer registrants a variety of benefits, but neither
program offers all of the legal benefits of marriage. 76 In Hawaii, two
adults may become reciprocal beneficiaries so long as they are not
parties to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship and are
prohibited from marrying one another—such as same-sex couples or
an unmarried mother and son. 77 In Colorado, two people may become
“designated beneficiaries” so long as both parties are competent,
unmarried adults who are not already registered as another person’s
“designated beneficiary.” 78
There are no state-wide civil unions, domestic partnerships, or
beneficiary programs in Ohio. Instead, a variety of local, public
institutions offer domestic partnership registries and benefits
programs. There are only three domestic partnership registries in
Ohio, which are respectively run by the City of Cleveland Heights, 79
the City of Cleveland, 80 and the City of Toledo. 81 These domestic
partnership registries were intended to show local acceptance of gay
and lesbian couples who are prohibited from marrying. 82 However,
74 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-102 (2010);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.09 (West 2010).
75 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-10-1 (2010) (limiting the right of intestacy only to legally
recognized husbands and wives).
76 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (2010) (“[T]he legislature believes that certain rights and
benefits presently available only to married couples should be made available to couples
comprised of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying one another.”). COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-22-105 (2009) (enumerating the rights available to “designated beneficiaries,”
such as the right to make medical decisions for one another, to visit each other in the hospital,
and to receive each others’ bodies after death).
77 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2010).
78 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-22-104 (2009) (listing the requirements to become a
“designated beneficiary”).
79 CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, ch. 181 (2003).
80 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 109 (2009).
81 TOLEDO, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 114 (2007).
82 For example, according to City of Cleveland Councilman Joe Cimperman, the main
sponsor of Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry, “[t]he passage of the Domestic Registry
legislation . . . [is an] example[] of the City’s commitment to and support of [Cleveland’s
LGBT] community.” Press Release, City of Cleveland, City Council and Cleveland LGBT
Community Proudly Announce 1st Annual LGBT Heritage Day (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.
clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/News/October62009/tabid/775/Default.aspx; see also Press
Release, City of Cleveland, Domestic Partnership Registration Opens on May 7th (May 6,
2009),
http://www.clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/News/May62009/tabid/677/Default.aspx

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

1328

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

these registries are mostly symbolic and do not grant registered
partners any legal status, protections, or benefits. 83
Ohio’s domestic partner registries have nothing to do with Ohio’s
public domestic partnership benefits programs. Simply joining the
Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, or Toledo domestic partnership
registry does not entitle a couple to domestic partnership benefits,
even from a public employer with a partnership benefits program.
Instead, employers in Ohio have complete control over whether to
offer domestic partnership benefits, the extent of the benefits offered,
and all eligibility criteria. Some public employers in Ohio limit
benefits only to same-sex couples, 84 and some grant equal benefits to
same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex couples. 85 Others grant samesex couples a wider array of benefits than their unmarried, oppositesex counterparts. 86 Additionally, for some employers, the marital

(noting Councilman Joe Cimperman’s involvement with Cleveland’s domestic partnership
registry and stating that couples can get necessary registration forms through the LGBT
Community Center of Greater Cleveland); see also infra Part VI(A)(2) (discussing the purpose
behind Ohio’s domestic partnership programs).
83 See Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, No. 94327, 2010
Ohio App. LEXIS 3981, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (“At most, [Cleveland’s]
domestic partner registry allows two people the legal right to be registered and recognized as a
domestic unit, which may help local businesses and private employers more easily identify
those couples who may qualify for domestic partnership benefits provided by such entities.”).
Private employers are not required to provide registered domestic partnership benefits of any
sort.
84 Miami University offers domestic partnership benefits only to same-sex couples. See
MIAMI UNIVERSITY BENEFITS SERVICES, AFFIDAVIT OF SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 1
(2004), http://www.units.muohio.edu/prs/benefits/Benefit%20Forms/Affidavit%20of%20Same
%20Sex%20Domestic%20Partnership.pdf.
85 Wright State University offers domestic partnership benefits to same-sex and oppositesex domestic partnerships. See WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, AFFIDAVIT OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 1–2 (2007), http://www.wright.edu/hr/
forms/affidavit08.doc.
86 The Ohio State University has a two-tiered domestic partnership benefits program that
it offers to “domestic partners” and “sponsored dependents.” Only same-sex couples are able to
join Ohio State’s health plan as “domestic partners.” See THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, AFFIDAVIT OF SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP FOR BENEFIT
COVERAGE 1 (2010), http://hr.osu.edu/Forms/Ben/ssdpaffidavit.pdf. Furthermore, as “domestic
partners” these couples receive all of the same health benefits as married couples. See THE OHIO
STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, MONTHLY HEALTH PLAN CONTRIBUTION
RATES FOR SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNER COVERAGE 1 (2010), http://hr.osu.edu/benefits/
Rates-SSDP-M.pdf (“The university’s contribution toward covering an employee’s same-sex
domestic partner and his or her children is the same as for covering a spouse and eligible
children of the employee.”). In contrast, to qualify for the sponsored dependency program,
opposite-sex couples must prove that the non-employee-partner is dependent on the employee
for over 50% of his or her income. See THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, AFFIDAVIT OF SPONSORED DEPENDENCY FOR BENEFIT COVERAGE 1 (2010),
http://hr.osu.edu/Forms/affterm.pdf. Additionally, Ohio State does not grant sponsored
dependents the same number of benefits as “domestic partners.” See THE OHIO STATE
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status and sexual orientation of their employees are irrelevant for
health insurance purposes. For example, the City of Columbus offers
the same benefits to its married employees as it does to its unmarried
(heterosexual and homosexual) employees in domestic partnerships. 87
III. THE TYPES OF MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS
Thirty states have amendments banning same-sex marriage. 88
These amendments fall into one of three categories: structure
amendments, status amendments, and substance amendments. 89
Structure amendments are the narrowest and do not
constitutionally define marriage. Instead, structure amendments give
the state legislature permission to define marriage as being between

UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, HEALTH PLAN CONTRIBUTION RATES FOR
SPONSORED DEPENDENT COVERAGE 1 (2010), http://hr.osu.edu/oe/Rates-SD.pdf (“The
university does not provide a subsidy toward the cost of providing health plan coverage to
sponsored dependents—employees are responsible for the full contribution amount(s).”).
87 Telephone Interview with Midge Slemmer, Emp. Benefits & Risk Manager, City of
Columbus (May 18, 2011).
88 These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix A (listing state
marriage amendments).
In contrast, same-sex marriage is allowed in Washington, D.C., Massachusetts, Vermont,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Iowa.
In 2011, legislators in Maryland and Rhode Island introduced bills to legalize same-sex
marriage. Although neither bill has yet passed, the governors of both states have announced
their respective support for them. See Annie Linskey & Julie Bykowicz, Six Senators Hold the
Key to Passage of Gay-Marriage Bill, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 6, 2011, at 1A; Katherine Gregg,
Same-Sex Marriage Bill Gains Speed, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Jan 6, 2011, at A.
California is in legal limbo. California used to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, and recognizes the same-sex marriages that were performed during that time. However,
after Proposition 8, California has stopped issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
Proposition 8 is currently in litigation. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding California’s same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional); see also supra
note 5.
While same-sex marriage licenses cannot be issued by the state of New York, New York
recognizes same-sex marriages that occur out-of-state. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (2008) (holding that, in the absence of express legislation to the contrary,
New York must recognize same-sex marriages that take place in other jurisdictions). Recently,
the Attorneys General of Maryland and New Mexico issued opinions stating their states may
recognize same-sex marriages created in other jurisdictions. Marriage—Whether Out-of-State
Same-Sex Marriage that Is Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland,
95 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 3 (2010); Are Same-Sex Marriages Performed in Other Jurisdictions
Valid in New Mexico?, Opinion No. 11-01 N.M.A.G. (Jan. 4, 2011).
89 See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive Framework for
Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U.L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2004)
(defining the three different types of state marriage amendments).
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one man and one woman if it so chooses. 90 Hawaii is the only state
with a structure marriage amendment. 91 The Hawaii Marriage
Amendment states: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples.” 92
Conversely, status amendments, which have been adopted by 10
states, 93 constitutionally define marriage as a union between only one
man and one woman. 94 Status amendments do not vary greatly
between states, are often one sentence long, and leave open the
possibility for marriage alternatives. 95 In 2004, Montana adopted an
archetypal status marriage amendment, which declares: “Only a
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in this state.” 96
Substance amendments differ greatly not only from “structure”
and “status” marriage amendments, but from each other as well. The
only unifying feature among substance amendments are their first
sentences, which define marriage as being between one man and one

See id. at 237–38 (discussing the nature of structure amendments).
See id. at 238 (noting that Hawaii is the only state with a structure amendment).
92 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
93 These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Tennessee. See infra Appendix A (listing state marriage
amendments).
94 See Baker, supra note 89 , at 223.
95 See id. at 223–29 (discussing the central features of status amendments). It is possible,
however, for a status amendment to be longer than one sentence. An amendment is a status
amendment so long as it does nothing more than define marriage as an institution between one
man and one woman. If this requirement is met, then the length of the amendment is immaterial.
For example, both Mississippi and Tennessee have status marriage amendments significantly
longer than one sentence:
90
91

Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this State only between
a man and a woman. A marriage in another State or foreign jurisdiction between
persons of the same gender, regardless of when the marriage took place, may not be
recognized in this State and is void and unenforceable under the laws of this State.
MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A;
The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract in
this state. Any policy or law or judicial interpretation, purporting to define marriage
as anything other than the historical institution and legal contract between one
(1) man and one (1) woman, is contrary to the public policy of this state and shall be
void and unenforceable in Tennessee. If another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a
license for persons to marry and if such marriage is prohibited in this state by the
provisions of this section, then the marriage shall be void and unenforceable in this
state.”
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18.
96 MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7.
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woman. 97 These first sentences make substance amendments
somewhat similar to status amendments.
The uniqueness of substance amendments exists in their second
sentences, which limit state recognition of nonmarital relationships.
These second sentences contain significant textual variations, suggest
widely differing legal effects, and often employ words and phrases
that have never before been legally defined. 98 For example,
Nebraska’s substance amendment prohibits the state from recognizing
same-sex marriages, same-sex civil unions, and same-sex domestic
partnerships; but it does not prohibit the state from recognizing
opposite-sex civil unions or opposite-sex domestic partnerships. 99 To
date, nineteen states have adopted substance marriage amendments,
including Ohio. 100
Ohio’s Amendment does not differentiate between unmarried
persons in opposite or same-sex relationships; it prohibits the state
from recognizing “a legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals.” 101 Several scholars believe that Ohio has one of the
broadest substance amendments in the United States. 102
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONCERNING
GAY RIGHTS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
This Part shows how the second sentence of Ohio’s Marriage
Amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, Section A explains the basics of equal protection
analysis and rational basis review. Section B analyzes Romer v.
Evans, 103 where the Supreme Court invalidated Colorado’s
97 Although Idaho’s marriage amendment is only one sentence long, it still qualifies as a
substance marriage amendment because it potentially limits state recognition of non-marital
unions. “A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be
valid or recognized in this state.” IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.
98 See Baker, supra note 89, at 230 (discussing substance amendments); see also Strasser,
supra note 14, at 59 (arguing that substance amendments will have grave and unintended
consequences if their vague language is broadly interpreted by the courts).
99 The Nebraska Marriage Amendment states: “Only marriage between a man and a
woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in
a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska.” NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.
100 These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix A (listing state marriage amendments).
101 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11(emphasis added).
102
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 89, at 233–34 (discussing the Ohio amendment and other
substance marriage amendments); Strasser, supra note 14, at 81–91 (discussing multiple
possible interpretations of the Ohio amendment).
103 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Amendment 2, a ballot initiative that prohibited the state from
granting anti-discrimination protection to gays and lesbians. 104
Section B also discusses Lawrence v. Texas, 105 where the Supreme
Court invalidated Texas’s criminal anti-sodomy law because it
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106
Next, Section C discusses Washington v. Davis, 107 Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 108
and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 109 three cases in which the
Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of facially neutral
policies and laws. Lastly, Section D concludes that the second
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment would be unconstitutional
under Feeney if 1) it disproportionately impacts same-sex couples and
2) the purpose behind the second sentence was to disproportionately
impact same-sex couples.
A. Introduction to Equal Protection Analysis
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” 110 The Supreme Court explains this phrase as
“essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.” 111
Assuming that a contested law does not burden a fundamental
right, which would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, the law is presumptively valid under the Equal Protection
Clause and subject only to “rational basis review.” Under this
standard, the law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.112 However, if the law makes a distinction
against a “suspect class”—i.e. racial, religious, and ethnic groups—
then the law is presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause and subject to “strict scrutiny.” Under this standard, the law
will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. 113 In cases where the challenged law classifies on the
104 Id.

at 623–24, 635–36.
U.S. 558 (2003).
106 Id. at 578–79.
107 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
108 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
109 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
110 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
112 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (outlining the basic principles of
rational basis review).
113 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[We] hold today
105 539
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basis of sex or gender, the legislation is subject to “intermediate
scrutiny.” Under this standard, the law is most likely presumptively
invalid, 114 and will be upheld only if it is substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives.115
Many legal experts—including President Barack Obama and
Attorney General Eric Holder—have argued that gays and lesbians
deserve heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases. 116 Some
commentators claim that gays and lesbians are a suspect class
deserving of strict scrutiny. 117 Others allege that laws targeting gays
and lesbians constitute gender discrimination and should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny. 118 Despite these arguments, the Supreme Court
has never explicitly determined the appropriate standard for LGBT
equal protection claims or whether LGBT persons constitute a suspect
class. 119
B. The Game Changers:
Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas
1. Romer v. Evans
The most influential equal protection case concerning the rights of
gays and lesbians is Romer v. Evans. 120 In Romer, the Supreme Court

that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.”).
114 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“Our case law [since 1971] does reveal a strong presumption that gender
classifications are invalid.”).
115 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that Oklahoma’s law allowing
women to buy beer at age 18, but requiring men to be at least 21, failed intermediate scrutiny).
116 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/11-ag-222.html (“After careful consideration, including a review of my
recommendation, the President has concluded that given a number of factors, including a
documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subject to a more heightened standard of scrutiny.”).
117 See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious)
Classification: An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay
Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against gays and lesbians is
a form of religious intolerance deserving strict scrutiny); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay
Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153 (1993) (arguing for
treatment of sexual orientation as a suspect classification deserving strict scrutiny).
118 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that laws that discriminate against
same-sex couples cannot survive intermediate scrutiny as applied to sex-based classifications).
119 See infra Part IV.B.
120 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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declared that Colorado’s Amendment 2 violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The citizens of Colorado had
adopted Amendment 2 into their state constitution through a statewide
ballot initiative. 121 The new constitutional amendment prohibited all
executive, judicial, and legislative action designed to protect
Colorado’s gays and lesbians from sexual orientation
discrimination.122 As a result of Amendment 2, ordinances in Aspen,
Boulder, and the City and County of Denver outlawing sexual
orientation discrimination were immediately rescinded. 123 If any city
or county wanted to offer protection to its gay and lesbian residents, it
would first have to successfully petition for an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution. 124
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy,
held that Colorado’s Amendment 2 was not only unconstitutional, but
that it “confound[ed the] normal process of judicial review.” 125 The
Court started with the premise that “if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the Court] will uphold
[a] legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate end.” 126 In the next sentence, however, the Court
declared that “Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this
conventional inquiry” for two distinct reasons. 127
First the very nature of Amendment 2—which ordered the denial
of all governmental protections to persons based upon their status in a
single group—constituted a per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court emphasized that “[i]n the ordinary case, a law will
be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government
interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of
a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous.” 128 The
Court halted its analysis, however, because Amendment 2 was not
“an ordinary case.”
121 Just like Colorado’s Amendment 2, Ohio’s Marriage Amendment was also adopted
through a ballot initiative. The ballot initiative process is a form of direct democracy that allows
individual citizens to propose, campaign for, and adopt state laws or constitutional amendments.
See John Gildersleeve, Note, Editing Direct Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of
Ballot Initiatives Offend the First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1441 n.21 (2007)
(explaining the mechanics of direct democracy). For more information on ballot initiatives, see
infra Part VI.B.1.
122 Romer, 517 U.S. at 626–28.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 631.
125 Id. at 633.
126 Id. at 631.
127 Id.at 632.
128 Id. (emphasis added).
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Instead, Amendment 2 had “the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group.” 129
According to the Court, Amendment 2 “identifies persons by a single
trait and then denies them [governmental] protection across the board.
The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to
seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our
jurisprudence.” 130 The Court concluded this argument without
conducting any further equal protection analysis. Solely because of
Amendment’s 2 unique denial of governmental protection to gays and
lesbians, the Court held: “A law declaring that in general it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws
in the most literal sense.” 131
Second, the Court held Amendment 2 unconstitutional because,
even if Romer were an “ordinary equal protection case calling for the
most deferential of standards,” 132 Amendment 2 failed rational basis
review.
One of the most basic tenants of equal protection law is that “a
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.” 133 According to the Court,
Amendment 2’s sweeping discriminatory effect proved that “the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected.” 134 The Court came to this decision even though
millions of Coloradans, each with their own unique reasons for
supporting Amendment 2, had voted in favor of the law. Further,
although the State of Colorado offered non-animus based reasons for
the law—such as the conservation of resources to fight racial
discrimination—the Court declared that “the breadth of [Amendment
2] is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it
impossible to credit them.” 135 Armed with the determination that
Amendment 2 was a hate-based ballot initiative, the Court stated
“[w]e must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone

129 Id.
130 Id.

at 633.

131 Id.
132 Id.

at 632.
at 634 (omission in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973)).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 635.
133 Id.
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else. This Colorado cannot do. . . . Amendment 2 violates the Equal
Protection Clause . . . .” 136
2. Lawrence v. Texas
Several years after Romer, the Supreme Court, in another opinion
written by Justice Kennedy, decided Lawrence v. Texas, 137 which
held Texas’s criminal sodomy law unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court could have based its Lawrence decision on
equal protection grounds because Texas’s sodomy law uniquely
criminalized homosexual, not heterosexual, oral and anal sex. 138
Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was based solely on this
equal protection analysis. 139 The majority, however, declined to use
equal protection because it feared that the states would simply rewrite
their laws to prohibit oral and anal sex between all couples. 140
Instead, the majority relied upon a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process analysis to reach its conclusion. Through this
process, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 141 a 1986 case
upholding Georgia’s criminal anti-sodomy law, and declared that
“[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.” 142
Holding that moral disapproval is not enough to uphold criminal
sodomy
laws 143—an
idea
accentuated
in
O’Connor’s
concurrence 144—the Court found that consenting gay and lesbian
136 Id. In contrast to Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia did not believe that Colorado’s animus
or hostility towards its gay and lesbian citizens rendered Amendment 2 unconstitutional. In his
dissent, Scalia even went so far as to find that that “Coloradans are . . . entitled to be hostile
toward homosexual conduct.” Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
138 Id. at 563.
139 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Rather than relying on the
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I
base my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”).
140 Id. at 574–75 (majority opinion).
141 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
142 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
143 Id. at 571 (“The condemnation [of homosexuality] has been shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many
persons these are . . . deep convictions . . . which thus determine the course of their lives. These
considerations do not answer the question before us, however . . . ‘Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992))).
144 Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Moral disapproval of [gays and
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adults “are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny . . . . As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.” 145
Although the majority opinion stated that Lawrence did not decide
the issue of same-sex marriage, 146 Justice Scalia’s biting dissent
argued that the majority’s opinion mandated it. According to Scalia,
“[t]his case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only
if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do
with the decisions of this Court.” 147
C. Embracing Washington v. Davis, Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., and
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
Despite the significance of both Romer and Lawrence for
proponents of LGBT rights, these cases are of limited use concerning
the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Both Romer and Lawrence dealt with
legislation that specifically targeted gays and lesbians. In contrast,
Ohio’s Amendment is facially neutral on the topic of sexual
orientation. Under the Amendment, Ohio and its political
subdivisions are forbidden from “creat[ing] or recogniz[ing] a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.” 148 As such, the Ohio Marriage Amendment defies Romerstyle equal protection analysis because it applies to all unmarried
individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation.
However, an equal protection inquiry into Ohio’s Marriage
Amendment does not end simply because its text is facially neutral on
sexual orientation. The Supreme Court has used equal protection to
invalidate many facially neutral laws written to disadvantage
unpopular, unnamed groups. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 149
the Court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance that required all city

lesbians] . . . is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law
that discriminates . . . .”).
145 Id. at 578–79.
146 Id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
147 Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added).
149 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

1338

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

laundries, except those located in brick buildings, to obtain a special
operating permit.
Although the San Francisco ordinance facially had nothing to do
with race, its effect was dramatic. The law essentially closed all of
San Francisco’s Chinese laundries, which were uniformly in wooden
buildings, while allowing white laundries, which were typically in
brick buildings, to remain open. 150 Furthermore, among the whiteowned laundries located in wooden buildings, all but one received the
necessary permit. 151 In contrast, San Francisco did not grant any
permits to Chinese laundries located in wooden buildings. 152
Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 153 the Supreme Court
invalidated Alabama’s redrawing of Tuskegee’s city limits. Although
the legislation did not mention race, the Court held the measure
unconstitutional because it removed from Tuskegee “all save only
four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white
voter or resident.” 154
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided three cases that heavily
influenced the Court’s jurisprudence on facially neutral statutes:
Washington v. Davis, 155 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 156 and Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney. 157 In these cases, each plaintiff alleged that a facially neutral
law was actually a sophisticated form of racial or sex-based
discrimination deserving heightened scrutiny.
Davis challenged the validity of an exam, Test 21, used by
Washington, D.C.’s Police Department to accept new recruits.158 The
plaintiffs alleged that Test 21 was racially discriminatory because
whites passed the test in disproportionately greater numbers than
blacks. 159
Similarly, in Arlington Heights, a real estate developer alleged that
the Village of Arlington Heights’ refusal to reform its zoning codes
was racially discriminatory. 160 By refusing to change its zoning codes,
150 Id.

at 359.

151 Id.
152 Id.
153 364

U.S. 339 (1960).
at 341. In addition to ruling on the act’s discriminatory impact, the Court also noted
the odd shape of the redistricting lines, which turned the square boundaries of Tuskegee “into a
strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure.” Id.
155 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
156 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
157 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
158 Davis, 426 U.S. at 234–35.
159 Id.
160 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 258.
154 Id.
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the Village effectively prohibited the construction of a low-income
housing project with a disproportionately minority population. 161
Finally, in Feeney, a female civil servant fought a Massachusetts
statute that gave an absolute hiring preference to veterans for civil
service positions. 162 Since ninety-eight percent of all Massachusetts
veterans at the time were male, “[t]he impact of the veterans’
preference law upon the public employment opportunities of
women . . . [was] severe.” 163
The plaintiffs in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney all
ultimately lost before the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme
Court recognized that these plaintiffs suffered disproportionately, 164
the Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny or declare the policies
unconstitutional because none of the policies were adopted with a
discriminatory intent.
In Davis, the Court did not find discriminatory intent because Test
21 was an exam commonly used in hiring practices throughout the
federal service. 165 Additionally, the D.C. Police Department did not
create Test 21; it was developed by the Civil Service Commission
without regards to the race of the test-taker. 166 Furthermore, while
using Test 21, the D.C. Police Department was also engaged in a
significant campaign to recruit and hire black officers. 167
In Arlington Heights, the Court determined that the Village of
Arlington Heights had not discriminated against racial minorities
when it refused to reform its zoning laws because the Village of
Arlington Heights had been undeniably committed to keeping the
residential area zoned only for single-family homes since 1959; the
rezoning request process did not waver from usual procedures; the
Village had given the real estate developer extra opportunities to
present his case during the public hearing process; and the statements
at the rezoning hearings focused almost exclusively on the zoning—
and not racial—aspects of the developer’s proposal. 168
Finally, in Feeney, the Supreme Court determined that the
challenged law was constitutional because it was not intentionally
designed to discriminate against women. Instead, Massachusetts’ civil
161 Id.
162 Feeney,

442 U.S. at 259.
at 271.
164 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 245–46; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 565–66; Feeney, 442
U.S. at 271.
165 Davis, 426 U.S. at 234–35, 246.
166 Id. at 234–35.
167 Id. at 246.
168 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269–71.
163 Id.
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servant law was created to reward the commitment and sacrifice of all
veterans. 169 According to the Court, “[w]hen the totality of legislative
actions establishing and extending the Massachusetts veterans’
preference are considered, the law remains what it purports to be: a
preference for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex,
not for men over women.” 170
Although this Note does not argue that same-sex couples deserve
heightened scrutiny in challenging Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, this
Note is dependent on the clear two-prong test set forth in Feeney. To
determine if a facially neutral law violates the Equal Protection
Clause it is necessary to ask: 1) Does the law disparately impact an
unnamed group of persons?, and 2) Does the “totality of legislative
actions establishing” 171 the disparately affecting law reflect an
invidious discriminatory purpose? 172 According to Feeney, invidious
discriminatory purpose “implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.” 173 If both prongs are met, then the law violates Equal
Protection. 174
D. Conclusion
An equal protection challenge can be made against the second
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment by establishing: 1) that
the removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership programs under the Ohio
Marriage Amendment would disparately impact same-sex couples,
169 Pers.
170 Id.

Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279–80 (1979).
at 280 (citation omitted).

171 Id.
172 Id. at 274 (“When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that
its effects upon women are disproportionably adverse . . . [it must be asked] whether the adverse
effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.”); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 241–42 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race. . . . Nevertheless, we have not held that a law,
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of
one race than of another.”); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–65 (“Washington v. Davis made
it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (citation omitted)).
173 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
174 In certain rare instances, however, the Supreme Court inferred discriminatory intent and
declared a violation of equal protection based upon disproportionate impact alone. See, e.g.,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Since
Yick Wo and Gomillion occurred before Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney, they should be
seen more as the exception than the rule.
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and 2) that the purpose behind the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment is to harm same-sex couples.
Parts V and VI establish that the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment satisfies both of Feeney’s prongs, thereby
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
V. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT IN OHIO’S DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
REGISTRIES AND BENEFITS PROGRAMS
Part V establishes that Ohio’s domestic partnership programs
overwhelmingly impact same-sex couples. Sections A and B provide
background information on Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and
show that same-sex couples make up the significant majority of
couples enrolled in them. Section C explains how the data concerning
Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits programs was gathered as well
as the data’s limitations. Section D establishes that same-sex couples
make up the majority of the couples receiving domestic partnership
health insurance at Ohio’s public institutions. Section E concludes
that the removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership programs would
disproportionately impact Ohio’s LGBT community and not the
general “unmarried” class.
A. Ohio’s Domestic Partner Registries
Three cities in Ohio have domestic partner registries: Cleveland
Heights, 175 Cleveland, 176 and Toledo. 177 The City of Cleveland
Heights has the oldest domestic partner registry in Ohio. Cleveland
Heights opened its domestic partner registry on January 26, 2004,
after voters approved the initiative in a local referendum in November
2003. 178 According to Heights Families for Equality, which placed the
registry on the 2003 ballot, Cleveland Heights’ registry was the first
piece of pro-gay-rights legislation ever approved in a voter ballot
initiative. 179 Almost four years later, the Toledo City Council
approved the creation of its domestic partner registry, 180 which went
into effect on December 21, 2007. 181 Less than one year later, on
175 CLEVELAND

HEIGHTS, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, ch. 181 (2003).
OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 109 (2009).
177 TOLEDO, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 114 (2007).
178 HEIGHTS FAMILIES FOR EQUALITY, http://www.heightsfamilies.org (last visited Apr. 3,
2011).
179 Id.
180 Eric Resnick, Toledo Council Passes Partner Registry, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON.COM
(Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories07/november/1116071.htm.
181 Ignazio Messina, Dozens Sign Toledo’s Domestic Partner Registry, TOLEDO BLADE,
176 CLEVELAND,
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December 8, 2008, the Cleveland City Council adopted Cleveland’s
domestic partner registry; 182 the registry opened on May 7, 2009. 183
Both Cleveland and Cleveland Heights’s domestic partner registries
were challenged for allegedly violating the Ohio Constitution. 184 To
date, no one has challenged Toledo’s domestic partner registry.
All three registries are open to same-sex and opposite-sex
couples. 185 Prospective registrants must pay a registration fee and file
a Declaration of Domestic Partnership. Additionally, eligible
registrants must be 18 years or older, in a committed relationship,
share a common residence, not be married or in a domestic
partnership with someone else, and not be related by blood. 186 None
of these registries grant legal rights to registered couples. The City of
Cleveland’s domestic partner registry ordinance even explicitly says
that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as recognizing or
treating a Declaration of Domestic Partnership as a marriage or a
legal status that intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance, or effect of marriage.” 187
While Ohio’s domestic partner registries may provide registered
domestic partners with a sense of appreciation and respect, they are,
in fact, little more than a city-sponsored list of names.
B. Domestic Partner Registries, Data
According to data collected in November 2009, Ohio’s domestic
partner registries are overwhelmingly used by same-sex couples. In

Dec. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 24490712.
182 Damon Sims, Cleveland Council Votes to Enact Domestic Partner Registry,
CLEVELAND.COM (last updated Dec. 9, 2008, 8:46 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/
12/cleveland_council_votes_to_ena.html.
183 Henry J. Gomez, Cleveland’s Domestic Partner Registry to Launch Next Week Amid
City Hall Celebration, CLEVELAND.COM (last updated Apr. 29, 2009, 4:14 PM), http://www.
cleveland.com/cityhall/index.ssf/2009/04/clevelands_domestic_partner_re.html.
184 See City of Cleveland Heights ex rel Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights, 832 N.E.2d
1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland,
No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010).
185 See supra notes 175–77.
186 See Criteria and Procedures for Domestic Partner Registry, CITY OF CLEVELAND
HEIGHTS, http://www.clevelandheights.com/citydept_community_domestic.asp?id=16 (last
visited Mar. 19, 2011) (explaining registration criteria and process); Declaration of Domestic
Partnership, CITY OF TOLEDO, http://www.ci.toledo.oh.us/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=UD5n4l
Lrr-g%3d&tabid=466 (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) (declaration form); Domestic Partner
Registry, CITY OF CLEVELAND, http://www.cleveland-oh.gov/CityofCleveland/Home/
Government/CityAgencies/Finance/AssessmentsandLicenses#domestic (last visited Mar. 19,
2011) (explaining criteria and process for registration of domestic partnership).
187 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 109.06 (2010).
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Table 1, the couples participating in these registries are listed as
“same-sex,” “opposite-sex,” or “unknown.” 188 An “unknown”
registered couple means that the couple registered either in the City of
Cleveland or Toledo and that the sex of both partners could not be
verified. 189 The City of Cleveland Heights records the gender makeup of its registered domestic partnerships.
The City of Cleveland Heights has the largest domestic partner
registry. There are 217 registered domestic partnerships; 156 couples
are same-sex and 61 are opposite-sex. 190 Thus, 72% of the couples in
Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry are same-sex.
In Toledo, there are 110 registered couples; 80 couples are samesex, 24 are opposite-sex, and 6 are of unknown gender make-up. 191
Therefore, in Toledo, same-sex couples make up 73% of registered
partners while opposite-sex couples make up only 22%; “unknown”
registered couples comprise 6% of the total.
Finally, the City of Cleveland has the greatest percentage of
registered same-sex couples. There are 164 registered couples in
Cleveland; 134 couples are same-sex—making up 82% of all
registered couples, 24 are opposite-sex couples—making up only
15% of all registered couples, and only 6 couples (3%) are of
unknown gender make-up. 192
On average, same-sex couples comprise 75% of all couples in
Ohio’s domestic partner registries. 193
C. Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Benefits Programs
The data concerning Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits
programs comes directly from the human resources departments of
Ohio’s public school systems, municipalities, public universities, and
community colleges. The data was collected primarily during the
188 Infra

Table 1.
the “unknown” instances either one or both partners used androgynous names (i.e.
Sam or Alex). If the partner could not be contacted or could not otherwise be confirmed as a
man or a woman, then the couple was placed in the “unknown” category.
190 E-mail from Susanna Niermann O’Neil, Vice City Manager, City of Cleveland Heights,
to author (Nov. 20, 2009, 16:04 EST) (on file with author).
191 E-mail from Gerald Dendinger, Clerk of Council, City of Toledo, to author (Nov. 25,
2009, 15:45 EST) (on file with author) (containing the Toledo Domestic Partner Registry). The
gender make-up of several couples could not be determined because some partners had
androgynous names and their identities could not be determined.
192 E-mail from Kim Roberson, Pub. Records Adm’r, City of Cleveland Dep’t of Law, to
author (Dec. 22, 2009, 15:05 EST) (on file with author) (containing Cleveland’s Domestic
Partner Registry). The gender make-up of several couples could not be determined because
some partners had androgynous names and their identities could not be determined.
193 See infra Table 1.
189 In
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winter and spring of 2010. However, mainly because some
institutions only recently adopted domestic partnership benefits, some
data was gathered in 2011. Data from other public institutions, such
as Ohio’s state-run hospitals, is not included.
Since Ohio’s domestic partnerships benefits programs vary greatly
from one another—for example, some packages offer life insurance
whereas others do not—this Note focuses only on the number and
make-up of domestic partnerships receiving health insurance.
D. Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Benefits Programs, Data
This section looks at the make-up of the couples receiving health
insurance through Ohio’s public domestic partnership programs.
Subsection 1 studies the make-up of couples receiving domestic
partnership health insurance through Ohio’s public school systems.
Subsection 2 looks at the couples receiving domestic partnership
health insurance offered through Ohio’s counties and municipalities.
Subsection 3 analyzes the couples who receive domestic partnership
health insurance though Ohio’s public universities and community
colleges. This Section concludes that, overall, same-sex couples make
up the majority of couples who are receiving public domestic
partnership health insurance, and that the removal of Ohio’s domestic
partnership benefits programs would disparately impact Ohio’s LGBT
community.
1. Public School Systems 194
Oberlin City Schools and Columbus City Schools are the only two
public school systems in Ohio that offer health insurance to its
employees and their domestic partners. 195 Oberlin City Schools has
the older program and offers coverage to both same-sex and oppositesex domestic partners. 196 In contrast, Columbus City Schools, which
created its domestic partnership benefits program in June 2009, offers
medical coverage only to same-sex domestic partners. 197
Although Oberlin City Schools offers health insurance to both
same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners, only one couple is
currently taking advantage of the program. This couple is same-

194 See

infra Table 2.
Simone Sebastian, Same-Sex Partners to Get Benefits, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June
6, 2009, at B1 (discussing the extension of benefits in Ohio’s public school districts).
196 See id.
197 See id.
195 See
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sex. 198 There are currently 27 same-sex couples receiving domestic
partner health insurance through Columbus City Schools. 199
Therefore, 100% of the couples receiving domestic partnership health
insurance through Ohio’s public school systems are same-sex.
2. Cities and Counties 200
Both the City of Columbus and the City of Cleveland Heights offer
domestic partnership benefits to their employees. The City of
Columbus offers equal domestic partnership benefits to its unmarried
same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 201 In contrast, Cleveland Heights
offers benefits only to same-sex domestic partners. 202 Currently, there
are 57 couples receiving domestic partnership health insurance
through the City of Columbus. 203 Forty of these couples (70%) are in
opposite-sex relationships; seventeen couples (30%) are same-sex. 204
In Cleveland Heights, there are no couples receiving domestic
partnership health insurance. 205 According to Bob Johnson, Cleveland
Heights’ Human Resources Manager, gay and lesbian employees
declined the insurance because of inequality in the federal tax code. 206
Unlike the health insurance enjoyed by married couples, domestic
partner health insurance constitutes taxable income for federal tax
purposes. 207
Franklin County and Lucas County are the only counties in Ohio
that offer domestic partnership benefits to their employees. In
Franklin County, where domestic partnership benefits are open to
198 Telephone

Interview with Diane Wolf, Treasurer, Oberlin City Sch. (Dec. 21, 2009).
Interview with Michael Straughter, Commc’ns Specialist, Columbus City
Sch. (Feb. 19, 2010).
200 See infra Table 3
201 Doug Caruso, Benefits OK’d for Domestic Partners, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 23,
2010, at A1.
202 Telephone Interview with Bob Johnson, Human Res. Manager, City of Cleveland
Heights (Feb. 23, 2010).
203 Telephone Interview with Midge Slemmer, supra note 87.
204 Id.
205 Telephone Interview with Bob Johnson, supra note 202.
206 Id.
207 According to Johnson, Cleveland Heights employees who wish to receive domestic
partnership health insurance would need to record an additional $12,000 of taxable income in
their federal income taxes. Id. Also, most of the human resource managers contacted for this
Note agreed that the current tax code had dissuaded many unmarried couples from enrolling in
their respective domestic partnership benefits programs.
The federal tax consequences of domestic partnership health insurance are felt nationwide
in both the private and public sectors. As a result, some private employers, such as Google, have
started to compensate their employees for the additional income taxes they pay on their
domestic partnership health insurance. See Tara Siegel Bernard, To Cover Tax, Google to Add
to Gays’ Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2010, at B1.
199 Telephone
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both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, there are 74 couples
receiving domestic partnership health insurance. 208 Twenty-five of
those couples (34%) are same-sex and 49 couples (66%) are oppositesex. 209 In contrast, Lucas County offers domestic partner benefits only
to same-sex couples. 210 There are five couples receiving domestic
partnership health insurance through Lucas County. 211
Therefore, there are a total of 136 couples receiving domestic
partnership health insurance through Ohio’s counties and
municipalities. Forty-seven of these couples (35%) are in same-sex
relationships and 89 of these couples (65%) are in opposite-sex
relationships. 212
3. Public Universities and Community Colleges 213
According to the University System of Ohio, there are a total of 37
public universities and community colleges in Ohio. 214 Eighteen of
these institutions offer domestic partnership health benefits to their
employees, 215 with seven offering domestic partnership health
insurance only to same-sex couples, 216 and eleven offering these
benefits to both same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex couples. 217
208 E-mail from Scott Solsman, Benefits Adm’r, Franklin Cnty. Coop. Health Benefits
Program, to author (Dec. 29, 2009, 09:43 EST) (on file with author).
209 E-mail from Scott Solsman, Benefits Adm’r, Franklin Cnty. Coop. Health Benefits
Program, to author (Dec. 28, 2009, 14:03 EST) (on file with author).
210 Telephone Interview with Colleen Abbott, Benefits Specialist, Lucas Cnty. (May 11,
2011).
211 Id.
212 See infra Table 3.
213 See infra Tables 4–7.
214 Explore Ohio’s Higher Education System, UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF OHIO, http://uso.
edu/network/usoSchools/index.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). This total breaks down into 14
public universities and 23 community colleges.
215 The thirteen public universities that offer domestic partnership benefits are: University
of Akron, Bowling Green State University, Central State University, University of Cincinnati,
Cleveland State University, Kent State University, Miami University, Northeastern Ohio
Universities Colleges of Medicine and Pharmacy (“NEOUCOM”), The Ohio State University,
Ohio University, University of Toledo, Wright State University, and Youngstown State
University. See infra Tables 4–5.
The five community colleges that offer domestic partnership benefits are: Central Ohio
Technical College, Cincinnati State Technical and Community College, Cuyahoga Community
College, Lakeland Community College, and Washington State Community College. See infra
Tables 4–5.
216 These schools are: University of Akron, Bowling Green State University, Cleveland
State University, Miami University, Youngstown State University, Cincinnati State Technical
and Community College, and Lakeland Community College. See infra Tables 4, 6.
217 These schools are: Central State University, University of Cincinnati, Kent State
University, NEOUCOM, The Ohio University, Ohio University, University of Toledo, Wright
State University, Central Ohio Technical College, Cuyahoga Community College, and
Washington State Community College. See infra Tables 4, 7.
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Nineteen of Ohio’s public universities and community colleges do not
offer domestic partnership benefits. 218
In total there are 510 couples receiving domestic partner health
insurance from Ohio’s public universities and community colleges. 219
Sixty-five percent of these couples (332) are in same-sex
relationships. 220 Only 25% of these couples (178) are in opposite-sex
relationships. 221
There are 47 couples receiving domestic partnership health
insurance from the seven schools that offer same-sex only partnership
policies. 222 Bowling Green State University is the latest public
university in Ohio to offer domestic partnership health insurance. On
October 1, 2010, the Bowling Green State University Board of
Trustees voted unanimously to adopt domestic partnership benefits. 223
The benefits took effect on January 1, 2011; 224 there are currently
seven couples receiving domestic partnership health insurance.225
The University of Akron has nine same-sex couples currently
receiving domestic partnership health insurance. 226 At Cleveland
State University, there are 12 couples.227 Miami University currently
has 24 couples receiving health insurance through the university’s

218 Only one of Ohio’s fourteen public universities, Shawnee State University, does not
offer domestic partnership health insurance. In contrast, eighteen of Ohio’s twenty-three
community colleges do not offer domestic partnership health insurance: Belmont Technical
College, Clark State Community College, Columbus State Community College, Eastern
Gateway Community College, Edison Community College, Hocking College, James A. Rhodes
State College, Lorain County Community College, Marion Technical College, North Central
State College, Northwest State Community College, Owens Community College, Rio Grande
Community College, Sinclair Community College, Southern State Community College, Stark
State College of Technology, Terra Community College, and Zane State College. See infra
Table 4.
219 See infra Table 5.
220 See infra Table 5.
221 See infra Table 5.
222 See infra Table 6.
223 See Sarah Ottney, BGSU Same-Sex Benefits are ‘Welcome and Needed,’ TOLEDO FREE
PRESS, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.toledofreepress.com/2010/10/29/bgsu-same-sex-benefits-are%E2%80%98welcome-and-needed%E2%80%99/ (describing BGSU’s extension of health care
benefits to same-sex partners).
224 See id.
225 See infra Tables 5, 6. There are an additional nine couples at Bowling Green State
University receiving domestic partnership dental insurance. Due to the limited focus of this
Note, however, only the domestic partners who are receiving health insurance are counted.
Telephone Interview with Rebecca Ferguson, Chief Human Res. Officer, Bowling Green State
Univ. (Jan. 19, 2011).
226 Telephone Interview with Kevin Turner, Assistant Dir. of Benefits Admin., Univ. of
Akron (Jan. 21, 2010); see also infra Tables 5,6.
227 E-mail from Gerald Modjeski, Dir. of Emp. Benefits, Cleveland State Univ., to author
(Dec. 18, 2009, 10:56 EST) (on file with author); see also infra Tables 5, 6.
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domestic partnership program. 228 At Youngstown State University,
there is only one same-sex couple receiving health insurance through
the university’s domestic partnership program. 229
Similarly, Cincinnati State Technical & Community College has
only one same-sex couple receiving domestic partner health
insurance. 230 Finally, Lakeland Community College, which created its
domestic partner benefits program in August 2009, has three couples
receiving partnership health insurance. 231
Among the eleven public colleges and universities that offer
domestic partnership benefits to both same-sex and opposite sex
couples, there are 453 couples receiving domestic partnership health
insurance. 232 From this subgroup, 275 couples are same-sex (61%)
and 178 couples are opposite-sex (39%). 233 Furthermore, of these
eleven institutions, two schools, Central State University and
Northeastern Ohio Universities Colleges of Medicine and Pharmacy
(“NEOUCOM”) have only same-sex couples receiving domestic
partnership health insurance. 234 And, at another two schools, The
Ohio State University and Central Ohio Technical College, same-sex
couples receive greater benefits packages than their opposite-sex
counterparts. 235 Furthermore, all same-sex couples at The Ohio State
University and Central Ohio Technical College are eligible to receive
domestic partnership benefits, but opposite-sex couples must meet
228 Telephone Interview with Sherry Schilling, Benefits Generalist, Miami Univ. (Dec. 17,
2009). There are 34 total couples who have signed Miami University’s Affidavit of Domestic
Partnership. However, since these 10 additional couples are not enrolled in the health insurance
program, and instead only use their domestic partnership status for family sick days, they are not
included in this Note’s results. Id.; see also infra Tables 5, 6.
229 E-mail from Steve Lucivjansky, Manager of Labor Relations, Youngstown State Univ.,
to author (Dec. 22, 2009, 12:48 EST) (on file with author); see also infra Tables 5, 6.
In addition to granting health insurance only to same-sex couples, Youngstown State
University also provides same-sex domestic partners with vision and dental insurance and
prescription coverage. Youngstown State University provides all of its employees who are in
registered domestic partnerships with Family Medical and Sick Leave. However, health
insurance is limited to only same-sex couples. Telephone Interview with Kathy Bouquet,
Manager of Emp. Benefits, Youngstown State Univ. (Dec. 16, 2009).
230 Telephone Interview with Davie Rainwater, Supervisor of Comp. & Benefits,
Cincinnati State Technical & Cmty. Coll. (Dec. 22, 2009); see also infra Tables 5, 6.
231 Telephone Interview with Carol Mangino, Assistant Dir. for Human Res., Lakeland
Cmty. Coll. (Dec. 22, 2009); see also infra Tables 5, 6.
232 See infra Table 7.
233 See infra Table 7.
234 Telephone Interview with Evelyn Adams, Human Res. Manager, Central State Univ.
(Jan. 4, 2010); Telephone Interview with Kathy Korogi, Human Res. Coordinator, NEOUCOM
(Jan. 4, 2010); see also infra Table 7.
235 Central Ohio Technical College is an affiliate of The Ohio State University and, as a
result, has the same domestic partnership benefits package. Telephone Interview with Sherry
Abbott, Human Res. Generalist, Cent. Ohio Technical Coll. (Jan. 5, 2010); see also supra note
86 (discussing The Ohio State University’s two-tiered domestic partnership benefits system).
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additional criteria to be eligible for domestic partnership health
insurance. 236
4. Summary of Data
The majority of couples receiving health insurance from Ohio’s
domestic partnership programs are in same-sex relationships. In total
there are 674 couples receiving domestic partnership health insurance
through Ohio’s public domestic partnership programs. 237 Of this total,
407 couples (60%) are same-sex and 267 (40%) are opposite-sex. 238
D. Conclusion
The removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and
domestic partnership health insurance programs would disparately
impact same-sex couples for two reasons. First, same-sex couples are
overwhelmingly represented in Ohio’s domestic partnership
programs. Same-sex couples make up, on average, 75% of the
couples in Ohio’s domestic partnership registries 239 and 60% of the
couples in Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits programs. 240 These
numbers take on even greater significance when one notes that gays
and lesbians make up only a small percentage of Ohio’s overall
population. 241 Second, unlike their opposite-sex counterparts, samesex couples do not have the option of leaving Ohio’s “unmarried”
class. If Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are removed,
opposite-sex couples may keep their benefits packages and enhance
their level of state recognition by getting married. Ohio’s same-sex
couples do not have this option.

236 See supra note 86 (outlining the differences between same-sex and opposite-sex
domestic partnership benefits at The Ohio State University).
237 See infra Table 8.
238 See infra Table 8.
239 See infra Table 1.
240 See infra Table 8.
241 According to the Williams Institute, there were an estimated 335,110 gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals living in Ohio in 2005, representing about 4% of Ohio’s population. GARY J.
GATES, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL
POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY app. 1 (2006),
available at http://www3.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLB
popACS.pdf. The Williams Institute currently estimates that there are over 8 million gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals in the United States, comprising roughly 3.5% of America’s adult
population. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 6 (2011), available at http://www3.law.ucla.edu/williams
institute/pdf/How-many-people-are-LGBT-Final.pdf.
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VI. INTENT AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS
Since using Ohio’s Marriage Amendment to remove public
domestic partnership registries and benefits programs would
disparately impact Ohio’s LGBT community, the next step is
determine whether the Ohio Marriage Amendment satisfies Feeney’s
second prong. Does the “totality of actions” surrounding the second
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment reflect an invidious
discriminatory purpose against gays and lesbians? 242 The answer is
“Yes” for three distinct reasons.
Section A asserts that, because domestic partnership programs
across the United States and in Ohio are designed primarily to benefit
same-sex couples, attacks on domestic partnership programs are
inherently attacks against gays and lesbians. Section B contends that
CCV and the OCPM abused Ohio’s ballot initiative process.
Specifically, this section alleges that ballot initiatives are vulnerable
to proponent manipulation, and that CCV took advantage of these
weaknesses and lied to voters about the Amendment’s scope in order
to pass hate-based legislation. Finally Section C argues that if the
Ohio Marriage Amendment destroys all of Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs, then the resulting consequences would be so
broad and so severe against Ohio’s LGBT community that, per Romer
and Lawrence, the second sentence would automatically betray an
intentional and unconstitutional antigay animus.

242 See Pers. Adm’n v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). Those who claim that Ohio’s
Marriage Amendment affects only unmarried couples, and not just gays and lesbians, might
point to the number of opposite-sex couples who would be impacted by the removal of Ohio’s
domestic partnership programs. Further, Feeney does provide some support for this claim.
In Feeney, the Court concluded that the Massachusetts law did not discriminate against
women in part because of the large number of men who were denied the veterans’ absolute
hiring preference. According to the Court, “[v]eteran status is not uniquely male. Although few
women benefit from the preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the
contrary, significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans—male as well as
female—are placed at a disadvantage.” Id. at 275.
However, Feeney is easily distinguishable from the present scenario for several reasons.
First, whereas “veteran status” was not uniquely “male” in Feeney, marriage in Ohio is uniquely
reserved for opposite-sex couples. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.01(C) (West 2010). Second, the Massachusetts civil service was not created as a way to
empower women. In contrast, domestic partnership programs have always been designed to
grant rights and recognition to same-sex couples. See infra Part VI.A. Finally, the original
purpose of the Massachusetts’ veterans’ preference law was to reward the patriotism of Civil
War veterans and ease their transition to civil life. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265. It had nothing to do
with the discrimination of women. In contrast, the Ohio Marriage Amendment has everything to
do with the moral disapproval of homosexuality and the delegitimation of same-sex couples. See
infra Parts VI.B & C. Thus the factors that the Court used to uphold Massachusetts’ veterans
preference are not present in the case against the Ohio Marriage Amendment.
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Therefore, this Note concludes the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment contains an invidious discriminatory purpose in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A. Attacks Against Domestic Partnership Programs Are
Attacks Against Same-Sex Couples
This Section looks at the purpose behind domestic partnership
programs throughout the United States and specifically within Ohio.
The legislative history of these programs establishes that all public
domestic partnership programs—even those that are open to oppositesex couples—are primarily designed to recognize and help same-sex
couples who are prohibited from marrying. Therefore, any attempt to
eradicate domestic partnership programs must necessarily be aimed at
the people these programs are designed to protect—gay and lesbian
couples—in violation of Feeney’s second prong.
1. The Purpose Behind Domestic Partnership Programs
Throughout the United States
History shows that attacks against domestic partnerships are per se
attacks against gays and lesbians, and not just “unmarried” couples.
Domestic partnership programs in the United States were—and
continue to be—developed at the behest of LGBT activists in the
hope of providing protection for and legitimacy to same-sex
couples. 243 The first domestic partnership programs in the United
243 See generally Leland Traiman, A Brief History of Domestic Partnerships, GAY &
LESBIAN REV., July–Aug. 2008, at 23 (chronicling the early history of domestic partnerships in
the United States and the vital role gays and lesbians played in creating domestic partnerships);
see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (1992)
(“Largely at the behest of gay-rights advocates, a number of municipalities are creating
domestic partnership ordinances, conferring certain benefits on domestic partners that are within
the authority of the local government to grant.” (footnotes omitted)); Heidi Eischen, Survey, For
Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation, 31
U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 530 (2000) (arguing that domestic partnership ordinances are the result of
LGBT advocacy).
A particularly salient example of LGBT domestic partnership advocacy is currently
unfolding in St. Louis, Missouri. On Christmas day in 2009, Missouri State Trooper Dennis
Engelhard was killed on Highway I-44 in the line of duty. In honor of his sacrifice, the Missouri
Legislature named the road on which he died the “Patrolman Corporal Dennis E. Engelhard
Memorial Highway.” However, the State of Missouri is refusing to grant Kelly Glossip,
Engelhard’s same-sex partner of nearly 15 years, over $28,000 in survivorship benefits.
According to state law, only legally recognized spouses are entitled to survivorship rights. The
Missouri Constitution prohibits same-sex marriage, however. Glossip is suing Missouri under
equal protection for the creation of domestic partnership survivorship benefits. See Jake
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States were created at the municipal level in the 1980s and early
1990s. 244 Although these early programs were open to both same-sex
and opposite-sex couples, 245 and were enjoyed mainly by oppositesex couples, 246 they were created primarily to benefit the LGBT
community. For example, San Francisco’s domestic partnership
ordinance, which was approved by voters in a 1990 referendum,
specifically states that its purpose “is to create a way to recognize
intimate committed relationships, including those of same-sex couples
who otherwise may be denied the right to marry under California
law.” 247
As same-sex marriage, civil unions, and other domestic
partnership programs have moved from the fringe to the mainstream,
it has become even clearer that “marriage alternatives” are designed
for same-sex couples who are prohibited from marrying. While many
legal theorists have argued that domestic partnership benefits should
and could be limited to same-sex couples, 248 and several courts have
agreed with these arguments, 249 no commentator has ever

Wagman, Fallen Trooper’s Gay Partner Sues Over Benefit Denial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 3, 2010, at A5.
244 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 243, at 1188–95 (discussing the first domestic
partnership programs in the United States); Eblin, supra note 64, at 1072–77 (chronicling the
early history of domestic partnership programs in the United States).
245 For example, in December 1984, Berkeley, California, became the first public employer
in the United States to offer health insurance to domestic partners, and the city did not
distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners. See Domestic Partnership
Information, CITY OF BERKELEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=4206
(last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (describing the city’s policy); Eblin, supra note 64, at 1072 (same).
246 See Eblin, supra note 64, at 1072–77 (explaining that the United States’ first public
domestic partnership programs benefited more opposite-sex couples than same-sex couples).
247 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 62.1 (2011) (emphasis added).
248 See James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to
Same-Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY: A REV. OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL &
TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 649, 666–67 (1998) (arguing that because same-sex couples may
not marry, “domestic partnership benefits should be exclusively tailored [for gays and
lesbians]”); Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with the
Needs of the Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic
Partners, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837, 860–65 (2004) (explaining why it would not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if government entities chose to extend family and medical leave only to
same-sex domestic partners). But see Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex
Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001
BYU L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2001) (“So long as domestic partnership schemes are the only
alternative available to same-sex couples, fairness dictates that these rights be extended equally
to opposite-sex, unmarried couples.”); Lynd, supra note 64, at 566 (concluding that domestic
partnership programs limited to only same-sex couples discriminate on the basis of sex and
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
249 See, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.)
(holding that it is not a violation of equal protection for a public employer to provide benefits
only to same-sex domestic partners); Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Sullivan, 497 F. Supp. 2d
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recommended that domestic partnership programs be limited only to
opposite-sex couples. 250 Furthermore, the theory behind marriage
alternatives has had a significant impact on the real world. While
many public employers have chosen to limit their domestic
partnership programs to same-sex couples, none offer domestic
partnership benefits exclusively to opposite-sex couples.
At the federal level, there is no movement to provide domestic
partnership rights to unmarried, opposite-sex couples. Instead, almost
all federal action on this issue has been focused on same-sex couples.
For example, on April 15, 2010, President Barack Obama directed the
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate new rules
concerning hospital visitation and medical decision-making rights. 251
The new rules, which went into effect on January 18, 2011, 252 require
all hospitals that receive Medicare and Medicaid funding to allow
patients to choose their visitors and to follow patients’ advance
directives, such as durable powers of attorney and health care
proxies. 253 Although the new rules affect both gay and straight

42, 45–46 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that an employer’s decision to provide domestic
partnerships benefits only to same-sex couples did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964). But see Ayyoub v. City of Oakland, No. 99-02937, at 4 (Cal. State Labor Comm’r
Oct. 27, 1997) (finding that the City of Oakland impermissibly engaged in sexual orientation
discrimination in limiting its domestic partnership benefits program only to same-sex couples),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/9170076/Ayyoub-v-City-of-Oakland. Ayyoub is the
only case to find impermissible discrimination in a domestic partnership benefits program
reserved for same-sex couples. As Ayyoub was an administrative decision, and, therefore, not
reviewed by any court, it is not binding law. Ayyoub is persuasive authority, however. See Lynd,
supra note 64, at 583–89 (describing Ayyoub and its significance).
250 There are, however, commentators who argue that domestic partnerships should not be
offered at all. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of
Domestic Partnerships Affect Marriage?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 105, 110 (2002) (arguing that
domestic partnerships dilute the value of marriage, particularly because they attempt to elevate
same-sex partnerships); Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American
Law Institute’s ‘Domestic Partners’ Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1222–27 (2001)
(arguing that domestic partnerships would devalue marriage because it would simultaneously
inspire same-sex couples to marry and encourage opposite-sex couples to forgo marriage).
According to Terry Kogan, the belief that domestic partnerships should be abolished is
inherently antihomosexual as it demonizes gays and lesbians and argues that same-sex
relationships lack all societal value. Kogan, supra note 248, at 1036–43.
251 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 3 C.F.R. § 20511 (2010); Michael D. Shear, Visiting Rights Given to Gays, WASH.
POST, Apr. 16, 2010, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Alters Hospital Rules for Gay Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A1.
252 Brian Bond, Hospital Visitation Regulations Go Into Effect Today, WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT BLOG, (Jan. 18, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2011/01/18/hospital-visitation-regulations-go-effect-today.
253 3 C.F.R. § 20511.

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

1354

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

couples, the change occurred because hospitals were routinely
denying gays and lesbians access to their partners.
Moreover, President Obama’s inspiration for the change was a
lesbian couple—Janice Langbehn and Lisa Pond. While vacationing
with their children in Florida in 2007, Pond suffered a brain
aneurysm. 254 Even though Pond and Langbehn had been partners for
eighteen years and had executed advanced directives and medical
powers of attorney for each other, the hospital refused to let
Langbehn visit Pond or make medical decisions on her behalf. 255 The
hospital kept Langbehn in the waiting room for eight hours and let
Langbhen see Pond only for five minutes while a priest administered
last rights. 256 When Pond died, Langbehnn was not allowed to be at
her side. 257 President Obama called Langhben from Air Force One on
the day he ordered the new hospital rules. 258
Additionally, federal domestic partnership benefits—to the extent
that they exist—are limited to federal employees in same-sex
relationships. On June 17, 2009, President Obama signed a
presidential memorandum granting long-term-care insurance and sick
leave to the same-sex partners of federal employees. 259 Although the
1996 Defense of Marriage Act prevents health insurance from being
offered to the same-sex partners of federal employees, legislators
have introduced bills in the House and Senate to overturn this
prohibition. In 2009, Representative Tammy Baldwin, the first openly
lesbian U.S. Representative, 260 and Senator Joseph Lieberman
sponsored the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act,
which would provide health insurance and other benefits to the samesex partners of federal employees. 261 President Barack Obama hailed
this act as a necessary step towards equality for federal LGBT
employees. 262 There has been no discussion of providing these
benefits to federal employees in opposite-sex relationships.
254 Tara

Parker-Pope, Kept from a Dying Partner’s Bedside, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2009, at

D5.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Shear,

supra note 251.
Vogel, Gay Couples Express Hope Over Benefits Extension, WASH. POST, June
18, 2009, at A21. For a more detailed discussion of the presidential memorandum, see Scott
Wilson, President Wades Into Gay Issues, WASH. POST, June 18, 2009, at A1.
260 Baldwin Breaks Barrier, Becomes First Openly Lesbian House Member, CNN.COM
(Nov. 3, 1998), http://articles.cnn.com/1998-11-03/politics/election_house_wisconsin.cd2_1_
sexual-orientation-health-care-key-issues?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.
261 H.R. 2517, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1102, 111th Cong. (2009).
262 See Administration of Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing a Memorandum on
259 Steve

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

2011]

WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY

1355

At the state level, there has been a consistent trend establishing
that “marriage alternatives” are designed for LGBT couples: once a
state adopts same-sex marriage, the state abolishes its “marriage
alternative” programs. 263 For example, Vermont, Connecticut, and
New Hampshire started offering civil unions to its LGBT couples in
2000, 2005, and 2007, respectively. 264 Same-sex marriage became
legal in these states in 2008 and 2009. 265 By the end of 2009, all three
of these states had passed legislation abolishing their civil union
programs. 266 On October 1, 2010, all existing civil unions in
Connecticut automatically converted into marriages. 267 On January 1,
2011, all New Hampshire civil unions converted into marriages as
well. 268
Similarly, in states where same-sex marriage is illegal, but where
statewide “marriage alternative” programs still exist, it is clear that
the purpose of these programs is to benefit and legitimize same-sex
couples. For example, in Wisconsin and Oregon, only same-sex
couples may enter into domestic partnerships. 269 In Washington, all
same-sex couples may join the state’s domestic partnership program;
however, Washington allows opposite-sex couples into its domestic
partnership program only when at least one partner is over sixty-two
years old. 270 Additionally, both Oregon’s and Washington’s domestic
partnership statutes explicitly acknowledge that same-sex couples
face discrimination in the United States. 271

Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination 1 (June 17, 2009), available at www.gpoaccess.gov/
presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900475.pdf.
263 See David D. Meyer, Fragmentation and Consolidation in the Law of Marriage and
Same-Sex Relationships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 115, 130–31 (2010) (discussing how once states
take intermediate steps towards recognizing same-sex couples, such as through civil unions,
they eventually disavow these intermediate steps and embrace same-sex marriage).
264 See supra note 56.
265 See supra note 56.
266 See 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis Serv. 3 (repealing title 18, section 5160 of the Vermont
Statutes Annotated, which allowed the state to conduct civil unions); 2009 Conn. Acts 09-13,
§ 21 (repealing Connecticut’s civil union statute effective October 1, 2010); 2009 N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis Serv. 59 (LexisNexis 2009) (ending New Hampshire’s civil union
program on January 1, 2010).
267 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38rr (West Supp. 2010) (stating that all Connecticut
civil unions will merge into marriages on October 1, 2010).
268 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46 (2010) (“Any civil union shall be dissolved by
operation of law by any marriage of the same parties to each other . . . .”).
269 WIS. STAT. § 700.01 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305 (2009).
270
WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26-60-010.
271
Washington’s domestic partnership law states:
The legislature finds that same sex couples, because they cannot marry in this
state, do not automatically have the same access that married couples have to certain
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In California, all same-sex couples may join the state’s domestic
partnership registry. Opposite-sex couples may also join California’s
registry, but at least one partner must be sixty-two years old or
older. 272 When California first began offering domestic partnerships
in 1999, partnership benefits were limited mainly to hospital
visitation and medical-decision rights. 273 As a direct result of
significant LGBT-rights lobbying, California now offers its domestic
partnership registrants almost full marital rights. For example,
domestic partners in California did not have the right to inherit
intestate until 2003. 274 The law changed after public outcry following
the death of Jeff Collman, a flight attendant on American Airlines
Flight 11, which crashed into the World Trade Center on September
11, 2001. 275 Because Collman had not executed a will, Keith
Bradkowski, Collman’s partner for eleven years, was unable to inherit

rights and benefits, such as those associated with hospital visitation, health care
decision-making, organ donation decisions, and other issues related to illness,
incapacity, and death. Although many of these rights and benefits may be secured by
private agreement, doing so often is costly and complex.
Id. Similarly, Oregon’s domestic partnership law states:
Many gay and lesbian Oregonians have formed lasting, committed, caring and
faithful relationships with individuals of the same sex, despite long-standing social
and economic discrimination. These couples live together, participate in their
communities together and often raise children and care for family members together,
just as do couples who are married under Oregon law. Without the ability to obtain
some form of legal status for their relationships, same-sex couples face numerous
obstacles and hardships in attempting to secure rights, benefits and responsibilities
for themselves and their children. Many of the rights, benefits and responsibilities
that the families of married couples take for granted cannot be obtained in any way
other than through state recognition of committed same-sex partnerships.
OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305(3) (2009).
272 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2011) (outlining California’s domestic
partnership program). Originally, California refused to allow opposite-sex couples into the
domestic partnership registry unless both partners were at least sixty-two years old. See Assemb.
B. 26, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (chaptered and approved by the governor on Oct.
2, 1999). See also Megan E. Callan, Comment, The More, the Not Marry-Er: In Search of a
Policy Behind Eligibility for California Domestic Partnerships, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427,
430–31 (2003) (discussing the eligibility requirements of California’s earlier domestic
partnership laws).
273 Assemb. B. 26, supra note 272.
274 Assemb. B. 2216, 2001–02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (codified as amended at CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 6401–6402 (West Supp. 2003) (effective July 1, 2003)); see also Callan, supra
note 272, at 433–34 (discussing the history behind California’s domestic partners receiving the
right to inherit intestate).
275 See Gay Partner of 9/11 Victim and Lambda Legal Lawyer to Attend Signing of Bill
Providing Inheritance Rights to Domestic Partners, LAMBDA LEGAL (Sept. 10, 2002), http://
www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/ca_20020910_gay-partner-of-911-victim-lambda-lawyer-attendsigning.html.
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from Collman’s estate, even though both men had joined California’s
registry. 276 Bradkowski not only attended the signing of Assembly
Bill 2216, which added intestacy to California’s Domestic Partnership
Act, but served as the principal witness for the California Assembly
and Senate during the bill’s debate. 277
Similarly, New Jersey’s “marriage alternative” programs were also
designed mainly to benefit same-sex couples. From 2004 to 2007,
New Jersey operated a two-tiered domestic partnership program.
Under this program, all same-sex couples could register as domestic
partners; opposite-sex couples could also join, but both partners had
to be over sixty-two years old. 278 Same-sex domestic partners also
enjoyed more rights under New Jersey’s two-tiered program because
they were prohibited from marrying. 279 Additionally, an
overwhelming majority of New Jersey’s registered domestic
partnerships were between same-sex couples. In 2004, New Jersey
registered 2,826 domestic partnerships: 98.4% of which were for
same-sex couples. 280 In 2005, New Jersey registered 1,059 domestic
partnerships: 96% were between couples in same-sex relationships. 281
In 2007, New Jersey created civil unions, which are offered
exclusively to same-sex couples and provide them with almost full
marital rights. 282 Although New Jersey did not abolish its more
limited domestic partnership program, it significantly tightened the
program’s eligibility requirements. Regardless of sexual orientation,
only couples where both partners are older than sixty-two may now
enter into a domestic partnership in New Jersey. Today, young and
middle-aged same-sex couples are forbidden from becoming domestic
partners or receiving marriage licenses; instead, they may only form
civil unions. 283
276 See

id.

277 Id.
278 2003

N.J. Laws 246.
id. (noting that the legislature sought to make certain benefits available to same-sex
domestic partners who were unable to enjoy such benefits through marriage).
280 New Jersey Health Statistics 2004: Marriages, Divorces and Domestic Partnerships,
N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVS., 2 (2004), http://www.nj.gov/health/chs/stats04
/marrdp04.pdf; see also Cleary, supra note 55, at 536 n.111 (discussing the fact that same-sex
couples overwhelmingly used New Jersey’s domestic partnership program).
281 New Jersey Health Statistics 2005: Marriages, Divorces and Domestic Partnerships,
N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVS., 10 (2005), http://www.nj.gov/health/chs/stats05/
marrdp05.pdf.
282 See 2006 N.J. Laws 103 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West Supp. 2010))
(adopted on Dec. 1, 2006 and effective as of Feb. 21, 2007).
283 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4.1 (West 2010); Recognition in N.J. of Same-Sex
Marriages, Civil Unions, Domestic P’ships and Other Gov’t-Sanctioned, Same-Sex
Relationships Established Pursuant to the Laws of Other States and Foreign Nations, 3-2007 Op.
279 See
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Finally, it is clear that marriage alternatives are designed primarily
for same-sex couples, even in states that do not impose age or gender
restrictions on domestic partners. For example, Nevada’s domestic
partnership law, which does not reference sexual orientation or
gender, was sponsored by openly gay state senator David Parks. 284
Further, both the opponents and supporters of Nevada’s domestic
partnership law categorized it as a gay rights issue. 285 Similarly,
Colorado’s designated beneficiary program, which also does not
reference sexual orientation or gender, was introduced in the
Colorado House and Senate by openly gay legislators (Colorado
House Representative Jennifer Veiga and Colorado Senator Mark
Ferrandino) and considered primarily as gay rights legislation. 286
Additionally, both gay rights advocates and opponents recognize
that Rhode Island’s recent decision to grant domestic partners funeral
arrangement rights was sparked by the story of Mark Goldberg. 287 On
October 2, 2008, Ron Hanby, Goldberg’s partner of seventeen years,
committed suicide. 288 The State of Rhode Island, however, refused to
recognize Goldberg as “next of kin” or give him Hanby’s remains,
even though the two men had married in Connecticut and had
executed testamentary documents for each other’s benefit, including
powers of attorney, wills, and living wills.289 Because of Rhode Island
law, Goldberg could not even place Hanby’s obituary in the local

N.J. Att’y. Gen. 4 (2007) (“[O]nce the law authorizing civil unions becomes effective, the only
new domestic partnerships that will be authorized are for couples, either same-sex or mixedgender, both of whom are over 62 years of age.”); see also Meyer, supra note 263, at 131
(discussing the evolution of New Jersey’s marriage alternatives).
284 See Cy Ryan, With Veto Override, Domestic Partners Bill Becomes Law: Nevada
Becomes 17th State to Recognize Gay Relationships, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 31, 2009), http://
www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/may/31/veto-override-domestic-partners-bill-becomes-law/.
285 See id. (explaining that the bill gives legal rights to same-sex domestic partners).
286 See Ernest Luning, Supporters Applaud Ritter for Signing Designated Beneficiary
Agreement Act, COLO. INDEPENDENT (Apr. 9, 2009 5:53 PM), http://coloradoindependent.com/
26266/supporters-applaud-ritter-for-signing-designated-beneficiary-agreement-act; Gay Rights
Beneficiary Bill Advances in House, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Feb. 21, 2009, 12:05 AM),
http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2009/feb/21/gay-rights-beneficiary-bill-advances-inhouse/.
287 See Katherine Gregg, R.I. Lawmakers Override Governor’s Vetoes, PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL (Jan. 5, 2010, 5:05 PM), http://newsblog.projo.com/2010/01/lawmakers-over-ridegovernors.html. Both pro- and antigay rights groups agree that the impetus for granting funeral
rights to domestic partners began with Mark Goldberg. See Peter Sprigg, Funerals, Domestic
Partners, and the Meaning of Marriage, FRCBLOG.COM (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.frcblog.
com/2010/01/funerals-domestic-partners-and-the-meaning-of-marriage/.
288 See Letter from Marc Goldberg to Senator Whitehouse (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://marriageequalityri.wordpress.com/2009/02/13/goldberg-letter-to-sen-whitehouse-partnerburial-rights/.
289 Id.
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newspaper. 290 Rhode Island did not give Goldberg his husband’s body
until over a month after his death, on November 6, 2008. 291
Public outcry resulted in a bill expanding funeral and burial rights
to domestic partners. When former-Governor Carcieri vetoed the
legislation, he said it was because the domestic partnership law
represented “the incremental erosion of the principles surrounding
traditional marriage.” 292 The Rhode Island legislature overrode the
governor’s veto on January 5, 2010. 293
2. The Purpose Behind Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Programs
Just like all other domestic partnership programs in the United
States, Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and benefits programs
are designed primarily to benefit same-sex couples who may not
marry. Although all three registries are open to same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, they were intended to provide local, symbolic
recognition to same-sex couples.
The City of Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry was
the result of a citizen initiative orchestrated by Heights Families for
Equality, which describes itself as a “coalition of gay and non-gay
voters working to promote access to basic rights for all.” 294 When
Cleveland Heights City Hall passed the domestic partner registry
ordinance, Council Member Nancy Dietrich likewise declared the
registry to be “an expression of the justice and equal treatment, for
all . . . .” 295
Similarly, Toledo City Councilman Joe McNamara, who
sponsored Toledo’s domestic partnership registry, intended the
registry to portray Toledo as a tolerant, diverse, and progressive city
for businesses and same-sex families. 296 When former Toledo City
Councilman Rob Ludeman voted against the registry, he claimed that

290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Gregg,

supra note 287.

293 Id.
294 HEIGHTS FAMILIES FOR EQUALITY, http://www.heightsfamilies.org/ (last visited Mar.
12, 2010).
295 Minutes of the Council Meeting of January, 20 2004, CITY OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, 8
(Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.clevelandheights.com/upload/newsletter/minutes_012004.pdf.
296 See Tom Troy, Domestic Partnership Registry OK’d by Toledo City Council:
‘Commited’ Couples May Gain Recognition of Relationship, TOLEDO BLADE (Nov. 14, 2007),
available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CIblb8M6hewJ:r.smart
brief.com/resp/iXgUhMrCCjiIvxfWhw+Domestic+Partnership+Registry+Ok%27d+by+Toledo
+City+Council&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a&source=www.google.com
(accessed by searching for the title of the article in the Google search archive).
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it was just an “attempt to tear down the institution of marriage
between a man and a woman.” 297
Finally, Cleveland City Councilman Joe Cimperman, a longtime
ally of Cleveland’s LGBT community, sponsored Cleveland’s
domestic partner registry, 298 which he openly hailed as a step towards
LGBT equality and proof of Cleveland’s commitment to its gay and
lesbian citizens. 299 Furthermore, the Gay Games chose Cleveland as
its 2014 host city in part because of its domestic partnership
registry. 300
Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits programs are also primarily
designed to benefit same-sex couples. In November 2004, when Ohio
adopted the Marriage Amendment, five public institutions offered
domestic partnership health benefits: the City of Cleveland Heights,
Ohio University, Miami University, Cleveland State University, and
Youngstown State University. 301 At the time, all of these institutions
reserved domestic partner health benefits exclusively for same-sex
couples. 302 Today there are 24 public institutions that offer domestic
partnership health benefits. 303 Ten of these institutions, representing

297 Id.
298 Domestic Partnership Registration Opens on May 7th, CLEVELAND CITY COUNCIL
(May 6, 2009), http://www.clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/News/May62009/tabid/677/
Default.aspx.
299 City of Cleveland, City Council and Cleveland LGBT Community Proudly Announce
1st Annual LGBT Heritage Day, CLEVELAND CITY COUNCIL (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.
clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/News/October62009/tabid/775/Default.aspx (“The passage of
the Domestic Registry legislation and the effort put into securing the 2014 Gay Games are
examples of the City’s commitment to and support of [Cleveland’s LGBT] community.”).
300 See Christopher Maag, Forget Chicago: Cleveland Gets the Gay Games, TIME (Oct. 1,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1927211,00.html.
301 See Rachel Abbey, On the Path to Domestic Partner Benefits in Ohio, FUSION MAG.,
Spring 2008, at 26 (establishing that Miami University, Ohio University, Cleveland State
University, and Youngstown State University all had domestic partnership benefits programs by
November 2004); Telephone Interview with Bob Johnson, supra note 202 (stating that
Cleveland Heights started offering domestic partnership health insurance in 2002).
302 The domestic partnership programs at Miami University, Cleveland State University,
and Youngstown State University have always been reserved for same-sex couples. In 2009,
Ohio University changed its domestic partnership benefits program to include opposite-sex
couples. Compare Superceded [sic] Policy & Procedure—40.013: Domestic Partner Benefits,
OHIO U., http://www.ohio.edu/policy/s40-013.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) [hereinafter OU
Superceded Policy & Procedure] (“For the purposes of this policy, ‘domestic partners’ are two
individuals of the same sex who share a regular and permanent residence . . . .”), with Policy &
Procedure—40.013: Domestic Partner Benefits, OHIO U., http://www.ohio.edu/policy/40013.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) [hereinafter OU Current Policy & Procedure] (“For the
purposes of this policy, ‘domestic partners’ are two individuals who share a regular and
permanent residence . . . .”).
303 See discussion supra Part V.D.
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42% of all public employers that provide domestic partnership health
insurance in Ohio, offer these benefits only to same-sex couples. 304
Of the fourteen institutions that offer domestic partnership health
benefits to gay and straight employees, three of them—Central State
University, NEOUCOM, and Oberlin City Schools—have only samesex couples receiving benefits. 305 Additionally, both The Ohio State
University and Central Ohio Technical College make it easier for
same-sex couples to receive domestic partnership benefits and offer
these couples better benefits than their opposite-sex counterparts. 306
Finally, although Ohio University now allows both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples to receive domestic partnership health
insurance, the program was originally limited to same-sex couples as
a “matter of equity and fairness.” 307 The program, which started in
2004, has been open to opposite-sex couples since only June 2009. 308
Therefore, at 16 of the 24 (67%) Ohio institutions that offer domestic
partnership health insurance, same-sex couples have either a currently
or historically preferred status.
There is also strong evidence that the domestic partnership
programs at Ohio’s remaining eight institutions were designed
primarily for same-sex couples. According to the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) University of
Cincinnati Chapter, the only reason the organization bargained for
domestic partnership benefits was to stop the university from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. 309 Likewise, the
AAUP Wright State University Chapter fought for domestic
partnership benefits on behalf of LGBT faculty. 310
Although other institutions may not be so forthright in describing
the purpose behind their domestic partnership policies, the desire to
304 See

discussion supra Part V.D.
discussion supra Part V.D.
306 See supra notes 86, 236 (discussing the two-tiered domestic partnership policy at the
Ohio State University and Central Ohio Technical College).
307 OU Superceded Policy & Procedure, supra note 302.
308 OU Current Policy & Procedure, supra note 302.
309 See AAUP Position on Domestic Partners Benefits, AAUP UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI,
http://www.aaupuc.org/dpposition.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
310 See generally Charles Derry, A Short Essay on (the Lack of) Domestic Partnership
Benefits at Wright State University: Two Arguments and Some Ironies, RIGHT FLIER (AAUPWright State University, Dayton, Ohio), Apr. 2005, available at http://www.wright.edu/admin/
aaup/rightflier/vol5no5Apr2005.pdf (discussing the injustice LGBT faculty must face at Wright
State University because they are not offered domestic partnership benefits); see also Anna
Bellisari, The Power of Collective Action, RIGHT FLIER (AAUP-Wright State University,
Dayton, Ohio), Feb. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.wright.edu/admin/aaup/rightflier/vol7
no2feb2007.pdf (highlighting the role Charles Derry’s article played in convincing Wright State
University to adopt a domestic partnership benefits program).
305 See
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help same-sex couples is still present, couched in the rhetoric of
“fairness” and “equality.” For example, at Kent State University, the
purpose of the domestic partnership program is euphemistically
described as a way to show an “appreciation and high regard for
diversity.” 311 Similarly, Franklin County’s domestic partnership
benefits program was created to reflect the “diversity” of Franklin
County’s workforce 312 and to achieve the goals of “fairness” and
“integrity.” 313 Even the City of Columbus, the most recent public
employer to offer domestic partnership benefits, acknowledges that
the program is predicated upon the concepts of “fairness” and
“equality.” 314
3. Conclusion
Domestic partnership programs in Ohio and across the United
States are innately designed to protect and benefit same-sex couples,
and not just the “unmarried.” Allowing opposite-sex couples access to
“marriage alternatives” does not change this reality. Further, it is
impossible to divorce domestic partnership programs from the LGBT
rights movement. While there are many domestic partnership
programs in the United States reserved exclusively for same-sex
couples, there is not a single public domestic partnership program in
the country open only to unmarried, opposite-sex couples. Therefore,
attacks against Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and benefits
programs intentionally and maliciously target same-sex couples.
Because the history of marriage alternatives shows that attacks on
domestic partnerships must necessarily be targeted attacks against
gays and lesbians, Feeney’s second prong is satisfied and the second
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment violates the equal
protection.

311 Research & Faculty Diversity—Benefits of Working at KSU, KENT STATE U.,
http://www.kent.edu/ehhs/rfd/diversity/benefits-of-working-at-ksu.cfm (last visited Mar. 13,
2010).
312 See Franklin County Board of Commissioners Minutes of General Session, FRANKLIN
COUNTY, 9 (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.co.franklin.oh.us/commissioners/board/documents/
August18GSminutes.pdf (Comments by Franklin County Human Resources Director Maggie
Snow stating that the new employee handbook, which includes domestic partner benefits,
helps to reflect the diversity of Franklin County’ s workforce).
313 Barbara Carmen, Commissioners Approve Domestic Partner Benefits, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2009/08/
18/fcpartners.html?sid=101.
314 Caruso, supra note 201.
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B. The Proponents of the Ohio Marriage Amendment Bear
Animus Towards Same-Sex Couples and Intentionally
Misled Voters About the Amendment’s Scope
This section looks at what the sponsors of the Ohio Marriage
Amendment advertised during the Issue 1 campaign and establishes
that the second sentence of the Amendment intentionally targets
same-sex couples, thereby meeting Feeney’s second prong.
First, this section establishes that ballot initiatives are vulnerable to
manipulation and misinformation, particularly when those initiatives
concern minority civil rights. Second, this section shows that Citizens
for Community Values (“CCV”), which ran the Ohio Campaign to
Protect Marriage (“OCPM”), bears a significant amount of animosity
towards gays and lesbians. Furthermore, CCV’s animus is identical to
the hate Colorado for Family Values (“CFV”) displayed during its
campaign for Amendment 2, which the Supreme Court overturned in
Romer v. Evans. 315 Finally, this section shows that CCV always
intended for the Ohio Marriage Amendment to prohibit all forms of
recognition for same-sex couples, no matter how innocuous, and that
they lied to or misled voters on this critical issue. This conclusion,
which is based upon CCV’s misleading statements, obfuscating
tactics, and animus towards gays and lesbians, establishes that the
Ohio Marriage Amendment was designed to specifically target samesex couples, and not just the “unmarried,” in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Ballot Initiatives
Ballot initiatives, particularly when they concern the rights of
minorities, are inherently vulnerable to proponent abuse and
manipulation. Ballot initiatives are a form of direct democracy in
which private citizens “propose a law or constitutional amendment,
place it on the ballot, and vote to adopt it into law, all without aid or
interference by their legislature.” 316 Although the Populist Movement
adopted ballot initiatives at the turn of the twentieth century, the
Founding Fathers explicitly rejected direct democracy and saw it as a
facilitator of tyranny.
The Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution states:
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a

315 517

U.S. 620 (1996).
supra note 121, at 1438.

316 Gildersleeve,
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Republican Form of Government.” 317 The Constitution promises the
states a republic, not a direct democracy. 318 Furthermore, the
Founding Fathers made this choice because they feared that pure
democracy would lead to mob rule. Indeed, the Founding Fathers put
many provisions in the Constitution specifically to prevent direct
democracy. For example, the Founding Fathers established the
Electoral College, thereby preventing the people from directly voting
for the President; 319 originally required state legislatures, and not the
people, to elect senators; 320 and prohibited the people from directly
amending the U.S. Constitution, leaving the amendment process to
Congress, state legislatures, and conventions. 321
Moreover many of the Founders detailed the evils of democracy
and the inherent value of republics in their writings. 322 According to
James Madison, one of the fathers of the Constitution, direct
democracy was an unstable form of government and a palpable threat
to minority rights.323 Furthermore, Madison believed that one of the
317 U.S.

CONST. art. IV, § 4.
In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449 (1891), the Supreme Court analyzed the meaning behind
the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. Its conclusion was against direct
democracy. According to the Court:
318 In

By the constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to every
State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right of the
people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their
own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose
legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves; but, while the
people are thus the source of political power, their governments, National and State,
have been limited by written constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set
bounds to their own power, as against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.
Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
319 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
320 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
321 U.S. CONST. art. V.
322 See Paula Abrams, The Majority Will: A Case Study of Misinformation, Manipulation,
and the Oregon Initiative Process, 87 OR. L. REV. 1025, 1030–35 (2008) (providing a thorough
account of the Founding Father’s dislike of direct democracy).
323 In The Federalist Papers, Madison stated:
[A] pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number
of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from
the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such
Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been
found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in
general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. . . .
A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for
which we are seeking.
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greatest strengths of republicanism, which he defined as “the total
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity,” 324 was its ability
to protect minority rights:
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part.
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of
citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the
rights of the minority will be insecure.325
Other Founding Fathers, such as Federalists Alexander Hamilton and
John Adams, also feared that direct democracy would result in
tyranny. In a scathing commentary on the history of pure
democracies, Hamilton noted, “[t]he ancient democracies, in which
the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of
good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure
deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an
ungovernable mob.” 326 According to Adams, the “simplicity of . . . a
pure democracy will always have its charm with minds not kept
awake to its susceptibility of abuse.” 327
Even the Anti-Federalists, the Founding Fathers who were more
supportive of direct democracy, realized that it should not be applied
at the state or federal level. As stated in the Brutus Essays, which
contain some of the Founding Era’s most forceful Anti-Federalist
arguments:
In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their
will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all
come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of
government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of
any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city,
or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can
conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992).
324 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 322 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992)
(emphasis omitted).
325 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992).
326 Abrams, supra note 322, at 1032 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Convention of New
York: Speech on the Compromises of the Constitution (1788), in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 440 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1850)).
327 Id. at 1033 (quoting John Adams, Illness in Europe—Commercial Treaties—Mission to
the Court of Great Britain, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 400, 428 (1856)).
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subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion
concerning it. 328
Therefore, while ballot initiatives are currently fashionable—more
state ballot initiatives have taken place since the 1990s than ever
before in U.S. history 329—the Founding Fathers abhorred direct
democracy on a large scale and diligently worked to protect the
United States from an institution that they believed threatened
minority rights. 330
The modern ballot initiatives process proves that the Founding
Fathers were right to be afraid. Although originally created as a way
to better serve the will of the people, modern ballot initiatives often
represent little more than the purist agendas of special interest groups.
According to political scientist Richard J. Ellis, modern ballot
initiatives suffer from voter drop-off, where voters show up at the
polls, but then fail to vote on ballot initiatives, as well as “congested
ballots and confused voters, deceptive titles and multiple subjects,
paid signature gatherers, rich individuals bankrolling pet initiatives,
and the pervasive influence of organized special interest groups.” 331
To support Ellis’s conclusion, one need only look at the extralegal
ballot initiative process.
By their very nature ballot initiatives operate outside of the
traditional system of checks and balances—a much-lauded hallmark
of representative democracy. Special interest groups get to draft their
ballot initiatives in secret. Once the measure’s petition gets enough
signatures in an ill-policed signature-gathering process, 332 the
initiative is placed on the ballot. If more than 50% of the people who
vote on that one specific issue vote in favor of the initiative, then it
328 BRUTUS NO. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 363, 369
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
329 See Gildersleeve, supra note 121, at 1443.
330 Additionally, for the reasons set forth above, there are many scholars who argue that
ballot initiatives violate the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Erwin
Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 301–04 (arguing
that direct democracy violates the Guarantee Clause); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1539–45 (1990) (finding direct democracy constitutionally
suspect and arguing that ballot initiatives should be subject to higher judicial scrutiny). But see
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (upholding a tax measure enacted via
ballot initiative).
331 RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA
192 (2002).
332 See ANTI-GAY R IGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES 3–4 (Stephanie L. Witt &
Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997) (“There are now consultants and corporations that virtually
guarantee, for a price, that they can get your initiative on the ballot. . . . The experts for hire and
the presence of relatively low signature thresholds in most states have contributed to the
explosion in the number of initiatives put before voters in recent elections.”).
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becomes law. There is no requirement that 50% of the people who
show up to vote approve of or understand the measure. 333
Furthermore, at no point in the life of a ballot initiative is there
legislative or executive review. 334 During the drafting process,
deliberation, debate, and compromise across party lines are all
notably absent. Elected legislators, professionals who are presumably
more aware of the nuances and consequences of words, have no input
in a potential law. Instead partisan citizens get to write and advertise
almost whatever they want, and they may decide that “confusion,
rather than clarity, better serves their interests.” 335 According to one
scholar of direct democracy, ballot initiatives “are not drafted in a
way that inspires confidence in their care for and attentiveness to the
problems they address. Written in secret by those who share a

333 According to scholar David B. Magleby, voter drop-off is a common problem. Magleby
estimates that about 15–18% of those who show up at the polls fail to vote on ballot initiatives,
and that voters are nearly twice as likely to drop-off on ballot propositions than on candidates.
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 100, 106 (1984) [hereinafter MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION]. Moreover, those who
drop-off tend to come from lower economic backgrounds, have lower education, and are racial
minorities, thereby making ballot initiatives unrepresentative of the total population. Id. at 103–
05. Additionally, the role of voter drop-off can have a significant impact in an election. For
example, one statewide initiative relating to civil service reform passed “despite getting the
votes of fewer than 15 percent of those who showed up at the polls.” ELLIS, supra note 331, at
128.
Voter confusion—even at the most elemental levels—is also a significant problem. Unlike
candidate races where voters cast their votes for specific politicians, ballot initiatives require
people to vote “yes” or “no,” and voters often confused as to what “yes” or “no” votes actually
mean. For example, in an analysis of a 1980 rent control initiative in California, “[o]ver threefourths of California voters did not match their views on rent control with their vote on the
proposition: twenty-three percent wanted to protect rent control but incorrectly voted ‘yes,’ and
fifty-four percent were opposed to rent control but incorrectly voted ‘no.’” David B. Magleby,
Let the Voters Decide?: An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO.
L. REV. 13, 39 (1995) [hereinafter Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?].
As an illustration of how unrepresentative ballot initiatives can be, suppose that there is a
state of exactly 100 people, and that there is an election with a ballot initiative section. Only 63
people show up at the polls. See Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential
Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 20, 2009), http://www.
census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html (finding that only 63% of eligible
voters in the West, Northeast, and South voted in the 2008 Presidential election). Taking
Professor Magleby’s 15% voter drop-off analysis into account, there are now only 53 people
voting on the ballot initiative section. See MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra, at 100. Thus,
a ballot initiative will be enacted depending on the cumulative “yes” or “no” votes of 27 people
in a state of 100. If the voter confusion rates are the same as in 1980 rent control study,
however, Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra, at 39, then 39 of the 53 people who voted on
the ballot initiative section would have accidentally voted for the wrong side.
334 See Abrams, supra note 322, at 1035–36 (discussing the lack of executive or legislative
review in the ballot initiative process).
335 Id. at 1035.

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

1368

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

common view of societal problems, ballot propositions eschew
compromise and tend toward extremism with appalling frequency.” 336
Once the initiative is adopted, the executive branch has no
authority to review, accept, or veto the law. Moreover, initiative
proponents cannot be held politically accountable for their policies
and agendas. Unlike members of the legislature, executive, or even
judiciary, the private citizens who sponsor discriminatory ballot
initiatives do not fear being voted out of office. Thus, while “judicial
review serves as the last level of scrutiny” in representative
democracy, it “provides the only substantive check on the enactment
of discriminatory laws through direct legislation.” 337 Also, when
ballot initiatives are aimed at limiting minority civil rights they enjoy
far greater success than other types of initiatives or referenda. 338 As
such, ballot initiatives are an exceptionally attractive way for antigay
interest groups to push through agendas that would otherwise not pass
in a representative democracy.
Finally, because ballot initiatives are not subject to executive or
legislative review, initiative proponents enjoy almost complete
control over drafting and advertising their measures. This lack of
oversight often leads to voter manipulation and confusion.
Initiative proponents are free to prey upon voters’ sensibilities by
giving their initiatives intentionally misleading and emotionally
charged titles. For example, the Ku Klux Klan sponsored the
“Compulsory Education Bill” in Oregon in 1922, which required all
336 James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 66 (1983).
337 Abrams, supra note 322, at 1054.
338 According to Professor Magleby, in a study of statewide ballot initiatives from 1898–
1992, ballot initiatives average a 38.1% passage rate. See Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?,
supra note 333, at 26. According to Barbara Gamble, in a study of civil rights ballot initiatives
between 1959–1993, however, 78% all ballot initiatives affecting civil rights resulted in the
defeat of minority interests. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 245, 254 (1997), cited in William E. Adams, Jr., Is it Animus or a Difference of
Opinion? The Problems Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 449, 463 (1998) [hereinafter Adams, Jr., Animus]. Moreover, when the
studied ballot initiatives addressed sexual orientation, 79% of these measures ended in the
limitation of LGBT rights. Gamble, supra, at 258, cited in Adams, Jr., Animus, supra, at 463.
Political scientists Donald P. Haider-Markel and Kenneth J. Meier also found similar results in
their study of ballot initiatives concerning gay rights.
From 1972 to 2001, at least 122 cities, counties, and states held initiatives and referenda
that in some way addressed the civil rights of lesbians and gays. Of these measures, 90 were
antigay in their intent, mostly repealing existing laws or banning the passage of gay civil rights
laws in the future. Over 71% of these initiatives and referenda have resulted in losses for
supporters of lesbian and gay civil rights. Only 32 initiatives sought to enact laws to ensure the
civil rights of lesbians and gays; almost 69% of these have failed. Donald P. Haider-Markel &
Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the
Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 20 REV. POL’Y RES. 671, 676 (2003).
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school-aged children to attend public schools. 339 At the time,
however, Oregon already required children between the ages of nine
and fifteen to attend school, but gave them the option of receiving a
public or private education. 340 Belied by its name, the Compulsory
Education Bill’s true purpose was to force the closing of Oregon’s
private Catholic schools. The Compulsory Education Bill passed with
52.7% of the vote 341 and remained law until 1925, when the Supreme
Court struck it down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 342 Similarly, in
2010, Oklahoma voters approved a ballot initiative prohibiting state
courts from using or considering Sharia law. 343 To date, however, no
Oklahoma court has ever cited to Islamic law in its decisions. 344 The
ballot initiative, which was passed by 70% of voters, was titled the
“Save Our State Amendment.” 345
Proponents may also draft radical or discriminatory initiatives, but
hide their true intent in a mass of facially neutral and ambiguous
phrases. For example, in Reitman v. Mulkey 346 the Supreme Court
struck down California’s Proposition 14, 347 a statewide ballot
initiative that had amended California’s constitution. 348 Proposition
14 did not mention the words “race,” “religion,” “ethnicity,” or
“discrimination” in its text, but the initiative’s immediate and
intentional effects were clear. 349 Once passed, Proposition 14
overturned California’s fair housing laws and enshrined a
constitutional right to engage in private housing discrimination. 350
Similarly, in 1994, the Florida Supreme Court struck down a ballot
initiative that would have prohibited the State of Florida from
granting antidiscrimination protection to gays and lesbians. 351
339 See Abrams, supra note 322, at 1041–50 (discussing the history of the Compulsory
Education Bill).
340 Id. at 1042.
341 Id. at 1050.
342 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
343 See Jess Bravin, Oklahoma Shariah Ban Halted, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2010, at A6.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
347 Id. at 380–81.
348 Id. at 370–71.
349 Id. at 371.
350 Id. at 380–81.
351 The Florida Supreme Court removed the proposed initiative from the Florida ballot in
In re Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen.—Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018
(Fla. 1994). The court held that the initiative was unconstitutional because it failed the Florida
Constitution’s “single-subject requirement.” Id. at 1020. The court also held that the initiative
was unconstitutional because the proponent’s description of the measure did not adequately
warn voters about the initiative’s potential consequences. Id. Notably absent from the court’s
decision was whether the proposed measure and the proponent’s description of the measure

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

1370

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

However, the authors of the proposed amendment did not include the
words “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” “homosexual,” or “sexual
orientation” in the initiative’s text. 352 Instead, for admittedly legal and
political reasons, 353 the initiative’s proponents drafted a law that
would have prohibited Florida and its political subdivisions from
extending antidiscrimination protections to anyone except on the
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap,
ethnic background, marital status or familial status.” 354 Although this
laundry list of “acceptable” classes made the Florida initiative facially
neutral, its target was abundantly clear. To obtain a copy of the
initiative’s petition, one first had to call 1-800-GAY-LAWS. 355
In addition to intentionally drafting confusing and ambiguous
laws, initiative proponents often use deceptive advertising to mislead
voters about an initiative’s legal scope. As a direct result of voters’
inability to understand the impact of ambiguous ballot initiatives, the
role of advertising, which guides voters’ beliefs about an initiative’s
scope, is exceptionally important. According to scholar Jane S.
Schacter:
Ballot propositions are presented to voters largely in a legal
vacuum, unconnected in any specific way to the surrounding
legal context. Because of this lack of context, many of the
interpretive issues that confront courts are outside the
plausible realm of voter contemplation. A vote in favor of a
ballot question will signify, at best, an electoral judgment on
the salient and general policies in question, not on the rarefied
points that often generate interpretive litigation.356
In a 1984 study once called “the broadest and most extensive
empirical analysis of direct democracy,” 357 political scientist David
Magleby analyzed how modern voters learn about the content of

“were affirmatively misleading because they failed to inform the voters of the measure’s central
purpose—to restrict the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.” William E. Adams, Jr., PreElection Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian
Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 618 (1994) [hereinafter Adams, Jr.,
Challenges].
352 See Adams, Jr., Challenges, supra note 351, at 589–90 (discussing Florida’s antigay
“stealth proposal”).
353 See id. at 590 n.19 and accompanying text.
354 Id. at 589 n.18.
355 Id. at 590 n.20.
356 Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 127 (1995).
357 Id. at 131 n.93 (referring to MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 333).
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ballot initiatives. 358 He concluded that not only are the majority of
voters unable to understand proposition texts, but that most
proposition voters “have only heard about the measure from a single
source, and . . . are ignorant about the measure except at the highly
emotional level of the television advertising, the most prevalent
source of information for those who have heard of the proposition
before voting.” 359 Furthermore, in later writings, Magleby declared
that “[h]ow campaigns have defined issues before the voters is
probably the most important explanation of voting behavior on ballot
questions.” 360 This argument is not only supported by other scholars
and non-partisan governmental committees, 361 but also by three
separate state supreme courts. 362
358 MAGLEBY,

DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 333, at 130–41.
at 198.
360 Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 333, at 38. As further proof of Magleby’s
assertion, one need only look at recent events in El Paso, Texas. In 2009, the City of El Paso
extended domestic partnership benefits to both gay and straight employees. Nineteen people
signed up for the program. In response, local Pastor Tom Brown wrote a proposed ballot
initiative that would require El Paso to endorse “traditional family values” by limiting health
benefits only to “city employees and their legal spouse and dependent children.” With
proponents advertising that the measure concerned only “traditional family values,” the
initiative passed with 55% of the vote. See Ana Campoy, Same-Sex Benefits Ban Roils El Paso,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2010, at A4.
Because of the initiative’s wording, however, the new law not only removed domestic
partnership benefits, but also prohibited El Paso from providing health insurance to retired city
workers. Id. According to the President of El Paso’s police union, the ordinance could deny
health insurance to as many as 10,000 retirees. Id.
A District Court judge recently granted a preliminary injunction against El Paso, noting
that the ordinance most likely violates the U.S. Constitution’s Contract and Equal Protection
Clauses. See Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 18–
20, Martin v. City of El Paso, Case No.3:10-cv-00468-FM.
361 See, e.g., CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 198 (1992) (finding that most voters get their
information from the mass media and paid political advertising), quoted in Schacter, supra note
356, at 131 (finding that most people get their ballot initiative information from thirty-to-sixtysecond TV spots); see also id. at 131 n.94 (listing various studies that also show that voters get
most of their ballot initiative information from the media).
362 In the early 20th century, the Montana, Arkansas, and Oregon Supreme Courts all noted
that voters received their ballot initiative information from few sources, relied heavily on the
media, and often based their vote on an initiative’s easily manipulated title. According to these
three state supreme courts:
359 Id.

The majority of qualified electors are so much interested in managing their own
affairs that they have no time carefully to consider measures affecting the general
public. A great number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial knowledge of
proposed laws to be voted upon, which is derived from newspaper comments or from
conversation with their associates. We think the assertion may safely be ventured
that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or zealously oppose the passage of
a proposed law, initiated by petition, who have attentively studied its contents and
know how it will probably affect their private interests. The greater number of voters
do not possess this information and usually derive their knowledge of the contents of
a proposed law from an inspection of the title thereof, which is sometimes secured
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The campaign for Colorado’s Amendment 2 shows just how
powerful false advertising can be in a ballot initiative campaign. In
1993, 71% of Coloradans believed that it should be illegal to fire a
person solely on the basis of his or her sexual orientation.363 In
contrast, Robert K. Skolrood, one of the drafters of Colorado’s
Amendment 2, specifically worded Amendment 2 to prevent gays and
lesbians from having any cause of action for discrimination in
“employment, education, housing, or status.” 364 During their
Amendment 2 campaign, CFV portrayed Amendment 2 as a
necessary piece of legislation to stop deviant homosexuals from
receiving “special rights.” 365 Instead of saying that Amendment 2
would overturn local antidiscrimination laws, CFV framed
Amendment 2 as a law prohibiting gay affirmative action programs,
even though no such programs existed in Colorado. 366 On November
3, 1992, 53% of Coloradans approved Amendment 2—thereby
making it perfectly legal for employers to fire workers based upon
their real or perceived sexual orientation. 367
Ballot initiatives suffer from significant vulnerabilities. They are
prone to manipulation and dogmatism at all levels of the process.
They circumvent the traditional checks and balances system and are
subject only to judicial review. Even the Founding Fathers rejected
ballot initiatives, regarding them as vehicles for majoritarian tyranny
and palpable threats to minority rights. Overall, ballot initiatives
represent an attractive alternative for special interest groups that wish
to push through purist, anti-minority agendas that are not shared by
the general population.

only from the very meager details afforded by a ballot which is examined in an
election booth preparatory to exercising the right of suffrage.
Sawyer Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 62 P.2d 342, 348–49 (Mont. 1936); Westbrook v. McDonald,
43 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Ark. 1931); State ex rel. Gibson v. Richardson, 85 P. 225, 229 (Or. 1906).
363 Sean Patrick O’Rourke & Laura K. Lee Dellinger, Romer v. Evans: The Centerpiece of
the American Gay-Rights Debate, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 332, at 133, 136.
364 Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and the Amendment 2 Controversy: The
Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in America, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R.
261, 286 (2002) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 18, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
365 See id. at 277–80 (discussing the “special rights” arguments made by Amendment 2’s
sponsors); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1352–53 (2000) (stating
that Amendment 2’s sponsors “emphasized that [Colorado’s] antidiscrimination ordinances not
only gave assertedly overprivileged homosexuals ‘special rights’ but also invaded the rights and
institutions of straight families”).
366 Debbage Alexander, supra note 364, at 279.
367 See O’Rourke & Dellinger, supra note 363, at 136.
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This Note contends that CCV and the OCPM entered into and
abused the ballot initiative process to unconstitutionally attack Ohio’s
LGBT community.
2. CCV Bears Unconstitutional Animus Against Gays and Lesbians
In 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”), labeled
eighteen organizations in the United States as antigay hate groups. 368
According to SPLC, an antigay hate group is defined as an
organization that engages in the propagation of known falsehoods
about gays and lesbians—i.e. makes “claims about LGBT people that
have been thoroughly discredited by scientific authorities”—and
engages in “repeated, groundless name-calling.” 369 An organization is
not an antigay hate group simply because it views homosexuality as
unbiblical. 370 CCV is officially associated with two antigay hate
groups, 371 including the American Family Association, an
organization that in May 2010 blamed gays and lesbians for carrying
out the Holocaust. 372
Further, much like the proponents of Colorado’s unconstitutional
Amendment 2, CCV itself bears an overriding animus against gays
and lesbians. According to CCV’s website, gays and lesbians suffer
from the “disease of homosexuality” 373 and, like those who engage in
rape, incest, pedophilia, and bestiality, are a “distortion of God’s
intention for human sexuality.” 374 Moreover, CCV alleges that an
368 Evelyn Schlatter, 18 Anti-Gay Groups and Their Propaganda, INTELLIGENCE REP.,
Winter 2010, at 35, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/
browse-all-issues/2010/winter/the-hard-liners. These antigay hate groups include: Abiding Truth
Ministries, American Family Association, Americans for Truth About Homosexuality,
American Vision, Chalcedon Foundation, Christian Anti-Defamation Commission, Concerned
Women for America, Coral Ridge Ministries, Dove World Outreach Center, Faithful Word
Baptist Church, Family Research Council, Family Research Institute, Heterosexuals Organized
for a Moral Environment, Illinois Family Institute, Liberty Counsel, Mass Resistance, National
Organization for Marriage, and Traditional Values Coalition. Id. at 35–43.
369 Id. at 35.
370 Id.
371
See CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES (May 18, 2011), http://www.ccv.org (stating
that CCV is officially associated with the American Family Association and the Family
Research Council).
372 See
Bryan Fischer, Homosexuality, Hitler, and ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’,
RENEWAMERICA (May 28, 2010), http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/fischer/100528
(“ Homosexuality gays us Adolph Hitler, and homosexuals in the military gave us the Brown
Shirts, the Nazi war machine and six million dead Jews.” ). Bryan Fischer is the American
Family Association’ s Director of Issue Analysis for Government and Public Policy. See also
Schlatter, supra note 368, at 36 (noting that the American Family Association is an antigay hate
group in part because of Fischer’s comments blaming gays and lesbians for the Holocaust).
373 Homosexuality: Where Do We Stand?, CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES, http://
www.ccv.org/issues/homosexuality/where-do-we-stand/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
374 Id.
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elaborate and militant network of homosexual activists is targeting
school children, some as young as elementary school, and
encouraging them to engage in sodomy. 375 CCV predicts that this
indoctrination could result in a rising number of homosexuals “in the
next ten to fifteen years if concerned, informed citizens do not
actively resist the organized effort to normalize homosexual behavior
in our society, especially in our schools.” 376 According to CCV, gays
and lesbians, who allegedly enjoy greater income and education
levels than the rest of America, 377 should not enjoy the protection of
antidiscrimination laws. 378 Instead, gays and lesbians are deserving of
“legitimate discrimination” because “the militant agenda of
homosexual activists represents the single greatest threat to . . . JudeoChristian family values, and to societal stability as a whole, of this
generation.” 379
In the mid-1990s the proponents of Colorado’s Amendment 2,
which was struck down in Romer because of its inherent animus
towards the LGBT community, 380 made nearly identical arguments in
their initiative campaign. For example, CFV often portrayed gays and
lesbians as elitists undeserving of discrimination protection and as
deviants and pedophiles who preyed upon school children. 381 The
375 Id. (“The purpose of [the Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network (GLSEN) and
other gay-straight alliances] is to train gay and lesbian students for activism and to encourage
‘straight’ students to experiment with homosexual behavior . . . .”).
376 Id.
377 Id. The claim that gays and lesbians inherently have higher levels of income than their
heterosexual counterparts, however, is false. In a recent USA Today report in comparing samesex couples who identified as “married” and opposite-sex married couples, same-sex spousal
couples enjoyed an average income of $91,558 while opposite-sex married couples enjoyed an
average income of $95,075. Report: Gay Couples Similar to Straight Spouses in Age, Income,
USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:09 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-11-02census-gay-couples_N.htm. Similarly, in a study analyzing the economic impact of being gay or
lesbian in the United States, the New York Times reported that, in the worst case scenario, a
same-sex couple would pay $467,562 more than an identical opposite-sex couple over the
course of their lifetime. Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, The Costs of Being a Gay Couple
Run Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at A1. In the best case scenario, a same-sex couple
would only pay $41,196 more than an identical opposite-sex couple. Id. Furthermore, since
fringe benefits can make up a substantial percent of an employee’s income, the denial of
domestic partnership benefits would only exacerbate the income disparities between same-sex
and opposite-sex couples.
378 CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES, supra note 373.
379 Id.
380 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
381 See, e.g., Debbage Alexander, supra note 364, at 276–77 & n.68, 278 (discussing how
Amendment 2’s proponents characterized gays and lesbians as pedophiles who, because of their
elitist economic status, did not need anti-discrimination protection); Eskridge, Jr., supra note
365, at 1352–53, 1382–83 n. 238 (discussing how CFV characterized gays and lesbians as
undeserving of “special” rights because they were deviants who wanted to indoctrinate and
molest school children). For an interesting account on the history and evolution of antigay
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CFV also declared that gay men regularly molested children and
ingested urine and feces. 382
Interestingly, proponents of Ohio’s Marriage Amendment shared
similar bizarre and off-putting sentiments at a Columbus forum
concerning Issue 1. At this event, Patrick Johnston, the vice chairman
of the Constitution Party’s Ohio branch, represented the proAmendment side. 383 Although Johnston was not officially affiliated
with CCV, he actively worked alongside Phil Burress to place the
initiative on the ballot. 384 At the forum Johnston declared, “I support
and endorse the criminalization of homosexuality.” 385 He also stated
that the imposition of the death penalty for homosexuality was not
necessarily unreasonable. 386 He said that the use of the death penalty
for gays and lesbians should be subject to “in-house debate [because]
[t]here were capital crimes in the Bible, and that would be something
debated.” 387
3. CCV Intentionally Misled Voters About the Scope of Issue 1
According to Justice Kelly’s dissent in National Pride at Work,
Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 388 where the Michigan Supreme Court
declaring domestic partnership benefits unconstitutional under the
Michigan Marriage Amendment, 389 ballot initiative proponents should
not be rewarded for intentionally misleading voters about an

discourse, see id. at 1338–53.
382 See Adams, Jr., Animus, supra note 338 at 469 n.111 (stating that Amendment 2’s
proponents claimed that gay men are pedophiles, will overrun the country’s hospitals with
AIDS, and that they “have sex with over 1,000 partners, urinate or defecate on each other, and
ingest urine and feces”) (citing Daniel A. Batterman, Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political
Process, Levels of Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29
NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 938 (1995)).
383 See Alan Johnson, Homosexuality Should Be Crime, Proponent of State Issue 1 Says,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 2004, at B5; see also Michelle Goldberg, Homosexuals Are
Hellbound!, SALON.COM (Oct. 18, 2004), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/10/18/
gayohio/index.html (describing a debate in which Johnston described homosexuality as sinful
and immoral).
384 See Johnson, supra note 383 (noting how Johnston extensively collected signatures to
place Issue 1 on the November 2004 ballot); Goldberg, supra note 383 (describing Johnston’s
work and relationship with the founder of CCV, Phil Burress).
385 Johnson, supra note 383.
386 Goldberg, supra note 383 (noting that while Johnston denied that he had ever advocated
for the imposition of the death penalty for homosexuals, he viewed the issue as a matter to be
left for the states to decide).
387 Id.
388 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
389 Id. at 543.
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amendment’s scope. 390 If the sponsors of a marriage initiative tell
voters that the proposed amendment will not harm state domestic
partnership programs, then the courts should not declare those
programs
unconstitutional—even
if,
post-ratification,
the
391
amendment’s sponsors claim otherwise.
During the campaign over Issue 1, CCV intentionally misled Ohio
voters about the Amendment’s scope. In an effort to appeal to more
moderate voters, the OCPM, CCV’s political action committee, 392
created campaign materials that promoted the Amendment as a
narrow law that would not hurt Ohio’s domestic partnerships. Indeed,
OCPM even entitled the initiative the “Marriage Protection
Amendment,” 393 thereby insinuating that Issue 1 would only “protect
marriage.” Once the Amendment passed, however, CCV performed a
bait-and-switch, launching a campaign to end Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs, institutions that enjoyed and continue to enjoy
majority support throughout Ohio. 394
In addition to harboring animus towards gays and lesbians, CCV
always intended to use Issue 1 to remove Ohio’s public domestic
partnership programs. When Barry Sheets, CCV’s current Director of
Governmental Affairs and the former Columbus Director of OCPM,
was challenged in a radio debate about the Amendment’s impact on
domestic partnership benefits, he responded that “domestic partner
benefits that are offered by a governmental entity would not be
allowed under [the Ohio Marriage Amendment].”395 Likewise, in an
article for Salon.com, Phil Burress, CCV’s founder, expressed his
contempt for public domestic partnership programs and stated that
public institutions are “using taxpayer money and giving out the
benefits of marriage when they have no right to do so.” 396

390 Id.

at 545–49 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
id at 548–49 (“[A] majority of likely voters favored an amendment that would bar
same-sex marriage but would go no further. Therefore, this Court’s majority errs by holding that
the amendment not only bars same-sex marriage but also prohibits the benefits at issue.”).
392 See Brief for Citizens for Community Values as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, supra
note 7, at 1 (highlighting the control CCV had over OCPM).
393 For a partial reproduction of the Ohio Secretary of State’s 2004 Issue 1 Report, see
infra Appendix G.
394 See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367 (2009) (Online Appendix Only, at 49, fig.
7),
http://www.columbia.edu/~jrl2124/Lax_Phillips_Gay_Policy_Responsiveness_2009.pdf
(finding that, based upon data from 1994–2008, nearly 60% of Ohioans support health benefits
for same-sex partners).
395 90.3 at 9 (Radio Interview on 90.3 WCPN broadcast Oct. 18, 2004) (Timestamp
45:45—45:53), http://www.wcpn.org/index.php/WCPN/nine/8260/.
396 Goldberg, supra note 383.
391 See
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Once the Amendment passed, CCV made good on its intentions.
David R. Langdon, CCV’s attorney and the author of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment, has served as plaintiff’s counsel in all three
cases challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic partnership
programs. 397 In the most recent case, Cleveland Taxpayers for the
Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, 398 Langdon argued that
Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry, in which same-sex couples
make up 82% of all registrants, 399 is illegal because:
The meaning of [the Ohio Marriage] Amendment is readily
ascertainable from the words used. The first sentence is clear
and unambiguous in defining marriage as ‘a union between
one man and one woman.’ The second sentence, which is at
issue in this case, is also clear and unambiguous. It prohibits
the state and its political subdivisions from creating or
recognizing a legal status for relationships that approximate
marriage, such as ‘civil unions’ or ‘domestic
partnerships.’” 400
Despite Langdon’s claims of textual clarity, however, the sponsors of
his amendment worked hard to convince Ohioans that the initiative
would not impact the state’s domestic partnership programs.
Looking at the pro-Issue 1 TV, radio, and newspaper
advertisements that are archived on OCPM’s website; 401 the Ohio
Secretary of State’s Issues Report, 402 where the OCPM officially
advertised the scope of the Marriage Amendment; and the general
information available on OCPM’s webpage, one would get the
distinct impression that Issue 1 would not adversely affect Ohio’s
domestic partnership programs. On OCPM’s website, there are two
newspaper ads, four radio ads, and one television advertisement in
favor of the Amendment. 403 None of the TV or radio ads directly
mention the Amendment’s impact on Ohio’s domestic partnership
397 See supra Part I (discussing Landon’s representation of plaintiffs who have challenged
Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and benefits programs).
398 No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010).
399 See infra Table 1 (providing data on Ohio’s domestic partner registries).
400 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, with Memorandum in
Support at 5, Cleveland Taxpayers, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (No. CV-09-701308) (citation
omitted).
401 Legal Issues & News, OHIO CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT M ARRIAGE, http://www.
ohiomarriage.com/Legal_Issues_&_News.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
402 See infra Appendix G.
403 OHIO CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT M ARRIAGE, supra note 401. The two newspaper ads are
reproduced infra in Appendix C, D, E, and F. The television ad and four radio ads are
transcribed infra in Appendix B and are on file with author.

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

1378

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:4

programs. 404 Although one radio ad briefly states that the “benefits of
marriage” should be given only to married couples, 405 the ad does not
define the “benefits of marriage” or the extent to which the “benefits
of marriage” could or should be curtailed. 406 Overall, the radio ads
more explicitly discuss Ohio’s tax rates than the fate of Ohio’s
domestic partnership programs. 407 Additionally, the vast majority of
these radio and television ads suggest that the Amendment is only
about keeping marriage between one man and one woman, calling the
entire campaign an issue of “respect for marriage” and “common
sense.” 408
Furthermore, the two newspaper ads archived on OCPM’s website
clearly state that Issue 1 would not remove Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs. The first newspaper ad, “Private Life,” 409
shows a photograph of two elderly women. 410 Beneath them in bold
and large font OCPM states “Don’t be confused about Issue 1.
Protecting marriage won’t hurt unmarried citizens.” 411
Underneath this declaration, the ad provides, in bold font, caps, and
italics, a “question and answer” section about the Amendment’s
scope. 412 According to the ad, “Q: Will [Issue 1] still protect the
benefits individuals and unmarried couples receive from their
employers? A: YES It allows for no interference with contracts
between private parties.” 413 The ad finishes by urging people to
ignore the “wild claims” against Issue 1 and by reassuring voters that
Issue 1 is only about reserving marriage as an institution for one man
and one woman. 414 There is no other mention about the impact of
Issue 1’s second sentence. 415

404 See

infra Appendix B.
Ways” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B.
406 “Both Ways” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B.
407 See “What You Know” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B.
408 See, e.g., “Common Sense” Television Ad, infra Appendix B (arguing that it is
“common sense” for marriage in Ohio to be between one man and one woman); “Common
Sense” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B (“Voting ‘Yes’ on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage Amendment,
is just common sense.”); “Respect” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B (arguing that the Ohio
Marriage Amendment is respectful towards gays and lesbians because it upholds God’s law and
divine truth).
409 Infra Appendices C, D.
410 Infra Appendix C.
411 Infra Appendices C, D.
412 Infra Appendix D.
413 Infra Appendix D.
414 Infra Appendix D.
415 Infra Appendix D.
405 “Both
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Similarly, in the newspaper ad “Common Sense,” 416 there is a
picture of a bride and groom holding hands. 417 Below the picture is a
text box asking in large and bold font “Will Issue 1 also protect
unmarried Ohioans?”. 418 Underneath this heading is the question
“Will [Issue 1] still protect the benefits individuals and unmarried
couples receive from their employers?” 419 Next to this question, in
capital letters and in large, bold font is the answer “YES.” 420
Surrounding this text box the ad urges Ohioans to vote for Issue 1
only “to keep marriage between one man and one woman.” 421 There
is no suggestion whatsoever in this ad that the Ohio Marriage
Amendment would affect Ohio’s domestic partnership programs. 422
Additionally, the Ohio Secretary of State’s Issues Report, which
does not vet for truth or accuracy, also failed to inform average voters
about OCPM’s intentions. 423 Under the heading “WHAT ISSUE 1
DOES,” OCPM states that “[i]ssue 1 restricts governmental bodies in
Ohio from using your tax dollars to give official status, recognition
and benefits to homosexual and other deviant relationships that seek
to imitate marriage.” 424 However, immediately below this declaration
under the heading “WHAT ISSUE 1 DOES NOT DO,” the report
states that “[i]ssue 1 does not interfere in any way with government
benefits granted to persons in non-marital homosexual relationships,
so long as the government does not grant those benefits to such
persons specifically for the reason that the relationship is one that
seeks to imitate marriage.” 425 In addition to being contradictory, these
declarations purposefully do not define “other deviant relationships,”
“government benefits,” or a relationship that “seeks to imitate
marriage.” 426 It is also noteworthy that OCPM never once suggests
that Issue 1 will affect, or is intended to affect, the rights and benefits
of straight couples in nonmarital relationships; the only benefits
programs that concern OCPM are those that are offered to “nonmarital homosexual relationships.” 427

416 Infra

Appendices E, F.
Appendix E.
418 Infra Appendix E.
419 Infra Appendix F.
420 Infra Appendix F.
421 Infra Appendix F.
422 Infra Appendix F.
423 See infra Appendix G.
424 Infra Appendix G.
425 Infra Appendix G.
426 Infra Appendix G.
427 Infra Appendix G.
417 Infra
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Finally, OCPM’s general website also sought to confuse voters
about the scope of Issue 1’s second sentence. In one lengthy diatribe
about the Marriage Amendment’s potential effects, OCPM states that
Issue 1 would “strictly [limit] the benefits of marriage to those who
are married and keep them from being given to unmarried
heterosexual or homosexual individuals, if the intent was to copy the
design of marriage, thereby circumventing marriage laws and
accessing its benefits through a back door.” 428 However, in an enewsletter, also available on OCPM’s website, OCPM urged its
supporters to tell undecided voters that “[i]n matters of health
benefits . . . private companies and governments are not allowed to
discriminate on the basis of marital status”429 and that “[t]he second
sentence [of the Ohio Marriage Amendment] simply guarantees that
the state and its political subdivisions will not . . . creat[e] ‘civil
unions’ or some other relationship that imitates marriage in all but
name.” 430
Therefore, despite recent assertions that the Marriage Amendment
clearly prohibits Ohio from recognizing domestic partnerships,
OCPM and CCV wanted voters to believe that Issue 1 would not
affect Ohio’s domestic partnership registries or health insurance
programs.
4. Conclusion
CCV and the OCPM misled voters about the scope of Issue 1 and
abused Ohio’s ballot initiative process.
The Founding Fathers feared that direct democracy could easily be
manipulated to deny civil rights to minorities, and Ohio’s ballot
initiative process proves that those fears were well-founded. Ohio’s
ballot initiative process lacks meaningful checks and balances and, as
such, is inherently vulnerable to manipulation.
Issue 1 proponents took advantage of these weaknesses and drafted
an ambiguous piece of legislation designed to discriminate against
gays and lesbians. They then played into discriminatory stereotypes
about gays and lesbians while simultaneously advertising that Issue 1
would not affect Ohio’s domestic partnership programs. After Issue 1
passed, CCV launched a campaign against Ohio’s public domestic
428 The Facts About Issue 1, OHIO C AMPAIGN TO PROTECT MARRIAGE, http://www.
ohiomarriage.com/Facts_About_Issue_1.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
429 E-Newsletter: The Home Stretch, OHIO C AMPAIGN TO PROTECT MARRIAGE (Oct. 30,
2004), http://www.ohiomarriage.com/E-News-10302004.htm (emphasis omitted).
430 Id.
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partnership registries and health insurance programs, which are
overwhelmingly used by same-sex couples, and claimed that the
Amendment prohibited these institutions.
The entire history of Issue 1 is predicated upon ambiguity,
obfuscation, and lies. CCV and OCPM always intended to harm
Ohio’s gay and lesbian community, but never explained their agenda
to the voters. Since Issue 1 passed via ballot initiative, the courts are
the only check upon the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Considering the
intentionally manipulative actions of the Amendment’s proponents,
the second sentence of Ohio’s facially neutral Marriage Amendment
should be found to target gays and lesbians, as prohibited under
Feeney’s second prong, and to violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. The Removal of Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Programs Would
Prove an Intent to Harm Same-Sex Couples in
Violation of Lawrence and Romer
Finally, this section contends that if the second sentence of the
Ohio Marriage Amendment invalidates Ohio’s public domestic
partnership programs, then the second sentence would result in almost
limitless discriminatory consequences to Ohio’s LGBT community.
Per Lawrence and Romer, 431 these broad, statewide effects would
necessarily betray an intentional, and unconstitutional, antigay animus
that would satisfy Feeney’s second prong in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Lawrence v. Texas, 432 the Supreme Court held that states could
not criminally punish gays and lesbians for engaging in intimate
sexual conduct. 433 Although the Court claimed that its opinion did not
affect state recognition of same-sex couples, 434 the majority’s
reasoning clearly impacts the status of same-sex relationships. 435
According to the Court, adult gays and lesbians not only have a
protected right to engage in private, intimate relations, 436 but to form
431 For

additional information on Lawrence and Romer, see supra Part IV.B.
U.S. 558 (2003).
433 Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”).
434 Id. (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
435 Indeed the Court’s language so obviously affects state recognition of same-sex couples
that Scalia’s dissent scathingly noted that “[t]his case ‘does not involve’ the issue of
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do
with the decisions of this Court.” Id. at 605 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
436 Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in
432 539
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committed and loving same-sex couples. 437 The Court noted that,
although sex is undoubtedly important to same-sex couples, much
like it is important to opposite-sex couples, “intimate conduct . . . can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.” 438 The
Court also recognized that “personal decisions relating to
marriage . . . [and] family relationships” 439 are afforded constitutional
protection, 440 and that “[t]hese matters, [which] involv[e] the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 441 The Court
finished its opinion with an invitation for future generations to end
institutionalized hatreds, declaring that morality, history, and tradition
alone are insufficient reasons to maintain discriminatory laws.442
According to the Court, “times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in
fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.” 443
The Lawrence decision greatly impacts the status of same-sex
couples. Under Lawrence, gays and lesbians have a Fourteenth
Amendment right to: 1) be gay, 2) engage in consensual sex, and
3) enter into same-sex relationships. If same-sex couples have a
Fourteenth Amendment right to exist under Lawrence, then what right
do the states have in turning these relationships into pariah-like nonentities at every level of state government, even down to the most
local municipal level? The answer, under Romer, is “none.”
Under Romer v. Evans, 444 the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment contains an unconstitutional animus against
gays and lesbians. In Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated
Colorado’s Amendment 2, which “prohibit[ed] all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government

the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons.”).
437 Id. at 574, 577–78 (finding that persons have a Fourteenth Amendment right to enter
into same-sex relationships and engage in intimate sexual behavior).
438 Id. at 567.
439 Id. at 574.
440 Id.
441 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 851
(1992)).
442 Id. at 571–572.
443 Id. at 579.
444 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

2011]

WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY

1383

designed to protect [gays and lesbians]” 445 and “repeal[ed] and
forb[ade] all laws or policies providing specific protection for gays or
lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado
government.” 446 To overcome Amendment 2 and its wealth of
consequences, 447 Colorado’s gay community would have needed to
“enlist[] the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State
Constitution . . . . This is so no matter how local or discrete the harm,
no matter how public and widespread the injury.” 448 According to the
Court, Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus,” 449 and that Amendment 2 lacked “any
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.” 450
Similarly, if Ohio’s domestic partnership programs were declared
unconstitutional, then the State of Ohio would effectively prohibit any
and all recognition for same-sex couples at every level of
government. This prohibition would stand no matter how limited or
local the recognition would be, and it would stand until a group of
individuals successfully petitioned Ohio’s citizenry to amend the
constitution. If Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are invalidated,
then the resulting hardships imposed on Ohio’s LGBT community
would prove that the Marriage Amendment’s second sentence is
based on antigay animus and lacks a legitimate government
interest. 451
445 Id.

at 624.
at 629.
447 See id. at 628–630 (noting that Amendment 2 would affect both private and public life
in Colorado). The Supreme Court also recognized that Amendment 2 could possibly affect
general antidiscrimination laws in Colorado, but the Court found that it did not need to decide
this issue to rule against Amendment 2. Id. at 630–31.
448 Id. at 631.
449 Id. at 632.
450 Id. at 635.
451 Moreover, the fact that Ohio’s Marriage Amendment would impact every level of Ohio
government is especially salient in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 943 (1998), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Cincinnati Charter Amendment
that prohibited anti-discrimination protection for gays and lesbians in large part because of the
amendment’s local nature. According to the Court:
446 Id.

The low level of government at which Article XII becomes operative is significant
because the opponents of that strictly local enactment need not undertake the
monumental political task of procuring an amendment to the Ohio Constitution as a
precondition to achievement of a desired change in the local law, but instead may
either seek local repeal of the subject amendment through ordinary municipal
political processes, or pursue relief from every higher level of Ohio government
including but not limited to Hamilton County, state agencies, the Ohio legislature, or
the voters themselves via a statewide initiative.
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Admittedly, unlike Amendment 2, Ohio’s Marriage Amendment
does not specifically single out gays and lesbians for unjust
treatment. 452 The neutrality of the Amendment’s text, however, does
not change the fact that: 1) Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are
overwhelmingly used by same-sex couples, 453 2) same-sex couples
cannot legally leave Ohio’s “unmarried class,” regardless of the
Amendment, 454 3) the author of the Marriage Amendment has served
as plaintiff’s counsel in all three cases seeking to end Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs, 455 and 4) the Amendment’s sponsors intended
to remove Ohio’s domestic partnership programs through the
Amendment’s second sentence, but did not inform the public of their
intent. 456
The second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment states
“[t]his state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize
a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.” 457 Neither the author of the Ohio Marriage amendment nor

Id. at 297.
452 Those who support CCV might further argue that CCV’s amicus brief in State v.
Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007), shows that CCV did not intend for the Ohio Marriage
Amendment to affect only gays and lesbians because Carswell involved an unmarried
heterosexual couple. Brief for Citizens for Community Values as Amicus Curiae Urging
Reversal, supra note 7, at 2. This argument, however, does not negate CCV’s misleading
advertisements or the hatred that CCV bears against Ohio’s LGBT community. See discussion
supra Part VI.B. Much like the Moralistic Position found in the writings of Lynn Wardle and
Lynne Marie Kohm, CCV’s position against domestic partnerships, at its core, revolves around
animus towards gays and lesbians. See supra note 250 (discussing the writings of Lynne Marie
Kohm and Lynn Wardle); discussion supra Part VI.B.2 (detailing CCV’s animus towards gays
and lesbians). Additionally, CCV’s position can be explained away by the circumstances
surrounding Carswell.
Most likely, CCV’s position on Ohio’s domestic violence statute was formed well after the
enactment of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. First, state marriage amendments are considered
to be civil, not criminal, laws. Prior to State v. Burk, No. CR-462150, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), no one had ever
argued that a marriage amendment could invalidate state criminal code. Unlike Brinkman,
Hicks, and Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution, which were all argued by Amendment
author David Langdon, Burk’s arguments were made by a defense attorney who had nothing to
do with CCV. Id. Second, since Carswell was the first time the Supreme Court of Ohio
addressed the Marriage Amendment, CCV was probably hesitant to advocate for a narrow
reading. If CCV had done so, then they risked the Ohio Supreme Court limiting the second
sentence to only civil unions, thereby weakening CCV’s campaign against Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs. Thus, CCV’s amicus brief in Carswell does not negate their intent to
target same-sex couples under the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment.
453 See supra Part V.
454 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C) (West 2010).
455 See supra Part I.
456 See supra Part VI.B.
457 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
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any Ohio court has ever provided a definition for a “legal status” that
“intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.” 458 Additionally, no Ohio court has ever defined “the
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.” 459 For example,
is the effect of marriage the spousal testimonial privilege, or is it the
right to inherit intestate? 460 Regardless of the answers to these
questions, however, it is entirely within the purview of the Ohio
judiciary to conclude that Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and
benefits programs violate the Ohio Constitution. 461
If the Supreme Court of Ohio invalidates Ohio’s domestic
partnership registries, then every public entity in Ohio would be
prohibited from recognizing same-sex couples so long as the
Amendment remains in effect. Ohio’s domestic partnership registries
offer its registrants no legal benefits whatsoever. 462 At most, these
registries offer a token symbolism to its registrants, 463 who are
overwhelmingly same-sex couples. 464 Therefore, if a registry that
458 Id. It should be noted that the phrase “intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage” does not modify the phrase “relationships of unmarried
individuals,” but rather the “legal status” that Ohio is forbidden from creating or recognizing.
The conjugation of “to intend” in this instance is for a subject in the third-person singular, “a
legal status.” Thus the “legal status” itself must “intend” to “approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage.” If the phrase “intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance or effect of marriage” was to modify the phrase “relationships of unmarried
individuals” then “to intend” would have had to be conjugated in the third-person plural, and the
sentence would read “[t]his state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a
legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intend to approximate the design,
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”
A close reading of the Amendment’s text directly contradicts what the Ohio Campaign to
Protect Marriage wrote in their statement for the Ohio Secretary of State’s Issues Report. See
infra Appendix G. In its report, OCPM wrote that “Issue 1 does not interfere in any way with
government benefits granted to persons in non-marital homosexual relationships, so long as the
government does not grant those benefits to such persons specifically for the reason that the
relationship is one that seeks to imitate marriage.” Id. Although OCPM provides no definition
for a relationship that “seeks to imitate marriage,” the subjective intent of those in a same-sex
relationship is irrelevant in the State’s granting of recognition. Those in a same-sex relationship
may very well intend to “approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”
However, if the State does not bestow upon this same-sex couple a “legal status” that “intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage,” then it is perfectly legal
under Ohio’s Marriage Amendment.
459 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added).
460 See Strasser, supra note 14, at 82–83 (discussing the importance of the word “the” in
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment and what could possibly be “the significance” or “the effect” of
marriage).
461 Cf. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008)
(holding that Michigan’s public domestic partnership benefits programs violated the Michigan
Marriage Amendment).
462 See supra Part V.A.
463 See supra part V.A.
464 See supra Part V.B.
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provides no benefits violates the Ohio Marriage Amendment, then
any program that does offer tangible or legal benefits—such as health
insurance or sick leave—must necessarily be unconstitutional as well.
The consequences of such a decision would be catastrophic.
Imagine that there is a married, same-sex couple from Iowa
driving through Ohio and they get into a car accident. What legal
rights and remedies could that couple have if even symbolic
recognition violates the Ohio Marriage Amendment? Barring a
change in the Ohio Constitution, many causes of action, such as loss
of consortium, would be out of their reach, 465 and the judiciary would
be prohibited from granting any exception. 466 Additionally, if one of
the partners were to die, how would the surviving spouse retrieve the
other’s body? Although this couple could travel with their marriage
license and various testamentary documents, there is no guarantee
that Ohio would—or even could—honor them. For example, in
Rhode Island, Mark Goldberg and his partner of seventeen years had
married in Connecticut and executed wills, living wills, and powers of
attorney for each other, but it still took Goldberg over a month to
receive his partner’s body from the state. 467
Additionally, the situation would not necessarily be better if the
Ohio Supreme Court condoned domestic partnership registries, but
declared Ohio’s public domestic partnership benefits programs
unconstitutional. The granting of health insurance to school and
municipal employees in committed same-sex relationships hardly
creates a “legal status” that approximates the significance of
marriage. Health insurance is not a design, quality, significance or
effect of marriage in Ohio or in any other state. 468 In fact, thousands
of married Ohioans go without health insurance every year. 469 In
465 See Haas v. Lewis, 456 N.E.2d 512, 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he right of
consortium, by its very definition, is a right which grows out of marriage, is incident to
marriage, and cannot exist without marriage. Because it is a marital right, the right of
consortium is not conferred upon partners to extramarital cohabitation.”).
466 Cf. Bashaway v. Cheney Bros., Inc., 987 So.2d 93, 95–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that, because the Florida legislature prohibited same-sex marriage, the Florida judiciary
could not allow same-sex couples a cause of action for loss of consortium).
467 See supra notes 287–91 and accompanying text.
468 In fact, in response to recent federal health care reform, several states have passed laws
prohibiting the state from requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. See, e.g., Rosalind
S. Helderman, Va. Lawmakers Pass Health-Plan Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2010, at B4
(discussing Virginia’s prohibition on mandated health insurance). Furthermore, Catholic
Charities stopped offering health insurance to the spouses of all employees in Washington, D.C.
specifically because Washington, D.C. had legalized same-sex marriage. See William Wan,
Catholic Charities to Limit Health Benefits to Spouses, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, at A1.
469 See Jack Torry, Uninsured Ohioans Have Lots of Company, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Apr. 8, 2009, at 04B. (reporting that there are 2.8 million uninsured Ohioans, that 71 percent of
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contrast, the ability for married couples to make medical decisions for
one another is a positive right in Ohio. 470 If the granting of health
insurance, which is not a right guaranteed to married couples,
somehow “create[s] or recognize[s] a legal status . . . that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage,” 471 then allowing same-sex couples to make important life
and death decisions for one another must inherently be prohibited by
Ohio’s public institutions as well. 472
If the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment is found
to prohibit all recognition of “unmarried” couples, then same-sex
couples who are forbidden from marrying will be non-entities under
Ohio law. Unlike opposite-sex couples who may freely choose to get
married, Ohio’s same-sex couples will be forced into an almost
pariah-like status, even at the municipal level. To receive health
insurance, token recognition, or claim each other’s bodies from the
state, same-sex couples would need to amend the Ohio Constitution.
And this outcome is exactly what the sponsors of the Ohio Marriage
Amendment hope will occur. 473 Simply put, no reason short of sheer
animus for gays and lesbians could explain an amendment of such
broad and merciless scope.
If Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are ever invalidated
under the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment, then
that sentence must be unconstitutional. According to Lawrence and
Romer, the effects of such a decision would be so broad as to render
Ohio’s same-sex couples legal pariahs and betray the Amendment’s
intentional antigay animus—thereby satisfying Feeney’s second
prong and violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

this group went more than six months without any health insurance, and that these numbers are
expected to get worse).
470 See State v. Ramirez, No. C-050981, 2006 WL 3040638, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27,
2006) (stating that married couples may make medical decisions for each other).
471 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
472 However, this possible state prohibition may be preempted by federal law. See supra
notes 251–53 and accompanying text (discussing newly promulgated federal rules requiring
hospitals to respect a patient’s choice of visitors and health care proxies).
473 See supra Part VI.B.2–3.
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VII. CONCLUSION
According to Feeney, a facially neutral law that disparately
impacts an unnamed group violates equal protection if the “totality of
actions” surrounding the law’s enactment reflects an intent to
discriminate against that group. 474 The removal of Ohio’s domestic
partnership registries and health benefits programs would disparately
impact same-sex couples. Further, the “totality of actions”
surrounding the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment
reflects an “invidious discriminatory purpose” against gays and
lesbians. This purpose can be found in three ways.
First, by looking at the history and practice of domestic partnership
programs throughout the United States and Ohio, it is obvious that
domestic partnership programs are designed primarily to help samesex couples. Therefore, any attack against Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs is inherently an attack against Ohio’s LGBT
community.
Second, CCV and OCPM launched an underhanded ballot
initiative campaign in order to harm Ohio’s LGBT citizenry. CCV
and OCPM always intended for the second sentence of the Marriage
Amendment to prohibit all state recognition of same-sex couples, but
advertised to voters that Issue 1 would not harm domestic partnership
programs and was limited in its scope. Once Issue 1 passed, CCV
advocated a broader interpretation of the Ohio Marriage Amendment.
With the approval and cooperation of CCV, the Amendment’s author,
David Langdon, launched a campaign against Ohio’s domestic
partnership programs. As a result of CCV’s propaganda about the
Amendment’s true impact and scope, the second sentence of the Ohio
Marriage Amendment should be seen a discriminatory piece of
legislation aimed at Ohio’s LGBT community.
Finally, if Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are ever
invalidated under the second sentence of the Marriage Amendment,
then the resulting effect on Ohio’s lesbian and gay citizens would be
broad and merciless. These consequences would betray the second
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment as a law built on
intentional antigay animus. This intentional hatred of same-sex
couples would be impermissible under both Lawrence and Romer,
and satisfy Feeney’s second prong.

474 Pers.

Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280 (1979).
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Therefore, for all of above mentioned reasons, the federal judiciary
should declare the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
MELISSA A. YASINOW †

†

J.D. Candidate, 2011, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
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# of
SameSex
Couples

# of
OppositeSex
Couples

# of
Unknown
Couples

Total #
of
Couples

% of
SameSex
Couples

% of
OppositeSex
Couples

% of
Unknown
Couples

City of
Cleveland 475
City of
Cleveland
Heights 476
City of
Toledo 477

134

24

6

164

82%

15%

3%

156

61

0

217

72%

28%

0%

80

24

6

110

73%

22%

5%

TOTALS:

370

109

12

491

75%

22%

3%

Table 1—Data on Couples in Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Registries

# of
Same-Sex
Couples

# of
OppositeSex
Couples

Total #
of
Couples

% of
Same-Sex
Couples

% of
OppositeSex
Couples

SameSex Only
Policy

Columbus
City
Schools 478
Oberlin City
Schools 479

27

0

27

100%

0%

X

1

0

1

100%

0%

TOTALS:

28

0

28

100%

0%

1

Table 2—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health
Insurance from Ohio’s Public School Systems

475 E-mail

from Kim Roberson, supra note 192.
from Susanna Niermann O’Neil, supra note 190.
477 E-mail from Gerald Dendinger, supra note 191.
478 Telephone Interview with Michael Straughter, supra note 199.
479 Telephone Interview with Diane Wolf, supra note 198.
476 E-mail
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# of
SameSex
Couples

# of
OppositeSex
Couples

Total #
of
Couples

% of
SameSex
Couples

% of
OppositeSex
Couples

SameSex
Only
Policy

0

0

0

0%

0%

X

17

40

57

30%

70%

25

49

74

34%

66%

5

0

5

100%

0%

X

47

89

136

35%

65%

2

City of
Cleveland
Heights 480
City of
Columbus 481
Franklin
County 482
Lucas
County 483

TOTALS:

Table 3—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health
Insurance from Ohio’s Cities and Counties

Bowling Green State
University
Central State
University
Cleveland State
University
Kent State University
Miami University
Northeastern Ohio
Universities Colleges
of Medicine and
Pharmacy
(“NEOUCOM”)
The Ohio State
University
Ohio University

Same-Sex Only
Domestic
Partnership
Policy
X

Neutral
Domestic
Partnership
Policy

X
X
X
X

X

X
X

Shawnee State
University

480 Telephone

Interview with Bob Johnson, supra note 202.
Interview with Midge Slemmer, supra note 87.
482 E-mail from Scott Solsman, supra note 209.
483 Telephone Interview with Colleen Abbott, supra note 210.
481 Telephone

No Domestic
Partnership
Policy

X
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University of Akron

X

University of
Cincinnati
University of Toledo

X

Wright State
University
Youngstown State
University
Belmont Technical
College
Central Ohio
Technical College
Cincinnati State
Technical &
Community College
Clark State
Community College
Columbus State
Community College
Cuyahoga Community
College
Eastern Gateway
Community College
Edison Community
College
Hocking College

X

James A. Rhodes State
College
Lakeland Community
College
Lorain County
Community College
Marion Technical
College
North Central State
College
Northwest State
Community College
Owens Community
College
Rio Grande
Community College
Sinclair Community
College
Southern State
Community College
Stark State College of
Technology
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X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Terra Community
College
Washington State
Community College
Zane State College
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X
X

7

11

19

Table 4—Types of Domestic Partnership Health Insurance Programs
Available at Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges

University of
Akron 484
Bowling Green
State University 485
Central State
University 486
University of
Cincinnati 487
Cleveland State
University 488
Kent State
University 489
Miami
University 490
Northeastern
Ohio Universities
Colleges of
Medicine and

484 Telephone

# of
SameSex
Couples
9

# of
OppositeSex
Couples
0

9

% of
SameSex
Couples
100%

% of
OppositeSex
Couples
0%

7

0

7

100%

0%

1

0

1

100%

0%

34

59

93

37%

63%

12

0

12

100%

0%

24

21

45

53%

47%

24

0

24

100%

0%

1

0

1

100%

0%

Total #
of
Couples

Interview with Kevin Turner, supra note 226.
Interview with Rebecca Ferguson, supra note 225. At Bowling Green State
University, there are currently seven couples enrolled for domestic partnership health insurance
and nine couples signed up for domestic partnership dental insurance. However, due to the
limited focus of this Note, only the domestic partners receiving health insurance are included in
the above table.
486 Telephone Interview with Evelyn Adams, supra note 234.
487 E-mail from Elizabeth Aumann, Dir. of Benefits, Univ. of Cincinnati, to author (Mar. 8,
2010, 12:25 EST) (on file with author).
488 E-mail from Gerald Modjeski, supra note 227.
489 Telephone Interview with Loretta Shields, Manager of Univ. Benefits, Kent State Univ.
(Dec. 22, 2009).
490 Telephone Interview with Sherry Schilling, supra note 228.
485 Telephone
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Pharmacy
(“NEOUCOM”) 491
The Ohio State
University 492
Ohio University 493
University of
Toledo 494
Wright State
University 495
Youngstown State
University 496
Central Ohio
Technical
College 497
Cincinnati State
Technical &
Community
College 498
Cuyahoga
Community
College 499
Lakeland
Community
College 500
Washington State
Community
College 501
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171

29

200

86%

14%

11
11

13
21

24
32

46%
34%

54%
66%

14

9

23

61%

39%

1

0

1

100%

0%

3

2

5

60%

40%

1

0

1

100%

0%

4

23

27

15%

85%

3

0

3

100%

0%

1

1

2

50%

50%

332
178
510
65%
35%
TOTAL
Table 5—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health
Insurance from All of Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges
with Partnership Policies

491 Telephone

Interview with Kathy Korogi, supra note 234.
from Katherine Shockley, Benefits Consultant, The Ohio State Univ., to author
(Jan. 12, 2010, 14:06 EST) (on file with author).
493 E-mail from Greg Fialko, Dir. of Benefits, Ohio Univ., to author (Feb. 4, 2010, 14:20
EST) (on file with author).
494 E-mail from Denise Shordt, Benefits Manager, Univ. of Toledo, to author (Jan. 20,
2010, 18:21 EST) (on file with author).
495 E-mail from Lindsey Carfrey, Benefits Generalist, Wright State Univ., to author
(October 7, 2010, 12:47 EST) (on file with author).
496 E-mail from Steve Lucivjansky, supra note 229.
497 Telephone Interview with Sherry Abbott, supra note 235.
498 Telephone Interview with Davie Rainwater, supra note 230.
499 Telephone Interview with Tanja Foster, Benefits Adm’r, Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. (Mar.
10, 2010).
500 Telephone Interview with Carol Mangino, supra note 231.
501 Telephone Interview with Sue Murdock, Dir. of Human Res., Wash. State Cmty. Coll.
(Dec. 12, 2009).
492 E-mail
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Miami
University
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State
University
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State
Technical &
Community
College
Lakeland
Community
College
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# of
SameSex
Couples
9

# of
OppositeSex
Couples
0

9

% of
SameSex
Couples
100%

% of
OppositeSex
Couples
0%

7

0

7

100%

0%

12

0

12

100%

0%

24

0

24

100%

0%

1

0

1

100%

0%

1

0

1

100%

0%

3

0

3

100%

0%

Total #
of
Couples

57
0
57
100%
0%
TOTAL
Table 6—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health
Insurance from Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges with
Same-Sex Only Partnership Policies

1

# of
OppositeSex
Couples
0

34

59

93

37%

63%

24

21

45

53%

47%

1

0

1

100%

0%

# of SameSex Couples
Central State
University
University of
Cincinnati
Kent State
University
Northeastern
Ohio
Universities
Colleges of
Medicine and
Pharmacy
(“NEOUCOM”)

1

% of
SameSex
Couples
100%

% of
OppositeSex
Couples
0%

Total #
of
Couples
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The Ohio State
University
Ohio University
University of
Toledo
Wright State
University
Central Ohio
Technical
College
Cuyahoga
Community
College
Washington
State
Community
College

171

29

200

86%

14%

11
11

13
21

24
32

46%
34%

54%
66%

14

9

23

61%

39%

3

2

5

60%

40%

4

23

27

15%

85%

1

1

2

50%

50%

TOTAL

275

178

453

61%

39%

Table 7—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health
Insurance from Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges
with Gender Neutral Partnership Policies

# of
SameSex
Couples

# of
OppositeSex
Couples

Total #
of
Couples

% of
SameSex
Couples

% of
OppositeSex
Couples

28

0

28

100%

0%

47

89

136

35%

65%

332

178

510

65%

35%

Ohio Public
Secondary
Schools 502
Ohio Counties
and Cities 503
Ohio Public
Universities
and
Community
Colleges 504

407
267
674
60%
40%
TOTAL
Table 1—Overall Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Benefits
from Ohio’s Public Institutions

502 Supra

Table 2.
Table 3.
504 Supra Table 5.
503 Supra
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APPENDIX A:
STATE MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS
State
Alabama

Substance Marriage Amendments
Constitutional
Text
Provision
Article I,
(a) This amendment shall be known and may
Section 36.03
be cited as the Sanctity of Marriage
Amendment.
(b) Marriage is inherently a unique
relationship between a man and a woman. As a
matter of public policy, this state has a special
interest in encouraging, supporting, and
protecting this unique relationship in order to
promote, among other goals, the stability and
welfare of society and its children. A marriage
contracted between individuals of the same
sex is invalid in this state.
(c) Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized
between a man and a woman, which, when the
legal capacity and consent of both parties is
present, establishes their relationship as
husband and wife, and which is recognized by
the state as a civil contract.
(d) No marriage license shall be issued in the
State of Alabama to parties of the same sex.
(e) The State of Alabama shall not recognize
as valid any marriage of parties of the same
sex that occurred or was alleged to have
occurred as a result of the law of any
jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage
license was issued.
(f) The State of Alabama shall not recognize
as valid any common law marriage of parties
of the same sex.
(g) A union replicating marriage of or between
persons of the same sex in the State of
Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be
considered and treated in all respects as
having no legal force or effect in this state and
shall not be recognized by this state as a
marriage or other union replicating marriage.
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Amendment 83,
Sections 1–3

1. Marriage
Marriage consists only of the union of one
man and one woman.
2. Marital status
Legal status for unmarried persons which is
identical or substantially similar to marital
status shall not be valid or recognized in
Arkansas, except that the legislature may
recognize a common law marriage from
another state between a man and a woman.
3. Capacity, rights, obligations, privileges,
and immunities
The legislature has the power to determine the
capacity of persons to marry, subject to this
amendment, and the legal rights, obligations,
privileges, and immunities of marriage.

Florida

Article I,
Section 27

Georgia

Article I,
Section 4,
Paragraph I

Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of
only one man and one woman as husband and
wife, no other legal union that is treated as
marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof
shall be valid or recognized.
(a) This state shall recognize as marriage only
the union of man and woman. Marriages
between persons of the same sex are
prohibited in this state.
(b) No union between persons of the same sex
shall be recognized by this state as entitled to
the benefits of marriage. This state shall not
give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other state or
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other state or
jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have
no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate
maintenance with respect to any such
relationship or otherwise to consider or rule on
any of the parties' respective rights arising as a
result of or in connection with such
relationship.
Only a marriage between one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical
or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized.
A marriage between a man and a woman is the
only domestic legal union that shall be valid or
recognized in this state.

Kentucky

Idaho

Section 233A

Article III,
Section 28
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Louisiana

Article XII,
Section 15

Nebraska

Article I,
Section 29

North
Dakota

Article XI,
Section 28

Ohio

Article XV,
Section 11

Oklahoma

Article II,
Section 35

South
Carolina

Article XVII,
Section 15

1399

Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist
only of the union of one man and one woman.
No official or court of the state of Louisiana
shall construe this constitution or any state law
to require that marriage or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon any member of a
union other than the union of one man and one
woman. A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized. No official or court of the state of
Louisiana shall recognize any marriage
contracted in any other jurisdiction which is
not the union of one man and one woman.
Only marriage between a man and a woman
shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The
uniting of two persons of the same sex in a
civil union, domestic partnership, or other
similar same-sex relationship shall not be
valid or recognized in Nebraska.
Marriage consists only of the legal union
between a man and a woman. No other
domestic union, however denominated, may
be recognized as a marriage or given the same
or substantially equivalent legal effect.
Only a union between one man and one
woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this state and its political
subdivisions. This state and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a
legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the
design, qualities, significance or effect of
marriage.
A. Marriage in this state shall consist only of
the union of one man and one woman. Neither
this Constitution nor any other provision of
law shall be construed to require that marital
status or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
B. A marriage between persons of the same
gender performed in another state shall not be
recognized as valid and binding in this state as
of the date of the marriage.
C. Any person knowingly issuing a marriage
license in violation of this section shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
A marriage between one man and one woman
is the only lawful domestic union that shall be
valid or recognized in this State. This State
and its political subdivisions shall not create a
legal status, right, or claim respecting any
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South
Dakota

Article XXI,
Section 9

Texas

Article I,
Section 32

Utah

Article I,
Section 29

Virginia

Article I,
Section 15-A

Wisconsin

Article XIII,
Section 13

[Vol. 61:4

other domestic union, however denominated.
This State and its political subdivisions shall
not recognize or give effect to a legal status,
right, or claim created by another jurisdiction
respecting any other domestic union, however
denominated. Nothing in this section shall
impair any right or benefit extended by the
State or its political subdivisions other than a
right or benefit arising from a domestic union
that is not valid or recognized in this State.
This section shall not prohibit or limit parties,
other than the State or its political
subdivisions, from entering into contracts or
other legal instruments.
Only marriage between a man and a woman
shall be valid or recognized in South Dakota.
The uniting of two or more persons in a civil
union, domestic partnership, or other quasimarital relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in South Dakota.
(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of
the union of one man and one woman.
(b) This state or a political subdivision of this
state may not create or recognize any legal
status identical or similar to marriage.
(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union
between a man and a woman.
(2) No other domestic union, however
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage
or given the same or substantially equivalent
legal effect.
That only a union between one man and one
woman may be a marriage valid in or
recognized by this Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a
legal status for relationships of unmarried
individuals that intends to approximate the
design, qualities, significance, or effects of
marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its
political subdivisions create or recognize
another union, partnership, or other legal
status to which is assigned the rights, benefits,
obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.
Only a marriage between one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in this state. A legal status identical
or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized in this state.
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Alaska

Arizona

California
Colorado

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nevada

Oregon

Tennessee
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Status Marriage Amendments
Constitutional
Text
Provision
Article I,
To be valid or recognized in this State, a
Section 25
marriage may exist only between one man
and one woman.
Article XXX,
Only a union of one man and one woman
Section 1
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in
this state.
Article I,
Only marriage between a man and a woman
Section 7.5
is valid or recognized in California.
Article II,
Only a union of one man and one woman
Section 31
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in
this state.
Article XIV,
Marriage may take place and may be valid
Section 263A
under the laws of this State only between a
man and a woman. A marriage in another
state or foreign jurisdiction between persons
of the same gender, regardless of when the
marriage took place, may not be recognized
in this State and is void and unenforceable
under the laws of this State.
Article I,
That to be valid and recognized in this state,
Section 33
a marriage shall exist only between a man
and a woman.
Article XIII,
Only a marriage between one man and one
Section 7
woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in this state.
Article I,
Only a marriage between a male and female
Section 21
person shall be recognized and given effect
in this state.
Article XV,
It is the policy of Oregon, and its political
Section 5a
subdivisions, that only a marriage between
one man and one woman shall be valid or
legally recognized as a marriage.
Article XI,
The historical institution and legal contract
Section 18
solemnizing the relationship of one (1) man
and one (1) woman shall be the only legally
recognized marital contract in this state. Any
policy or law or judicial interpretation,
purporting to define marriage as anything
other than the historical institution and legal
contract between one (1) man and one (1)
woman, is contrary to the public policy of
this state and shall be void and
unenforceable in Tennessee. If another state
or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for
persons to marry and if such marriage is
prohibited in this state by the provisions of
this section, then the marriage shall be void
and unenforceable in this state.
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Structure Marriage Amendments
Constitutional
Text
Provision
Article 1,
The legislature shall have the power to
Section 23
reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.

3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM

2011]

WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY

1403

APPENDIX B:
RADIO & TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENT TRANSCRIPTS
Transcript of “Common Sense” Television Ad:
It’s just common sense. Ohio families are stronger with a wife
AND a husband. Our children do better with a mother AND a father.
We won’t have a future unless moms and dads have children. That’s
why governments have recognized and uniquely protected marriage
for more than 2,000 years. Why change that? Voting “Yes” on Issue 1
KEEPS marriage between one man and one woman. That’s just
common sense. Say “Yes” to marriage. Vote “Yes” on Issue 1. It’s
just common sense.
Transcript of “What You Know” Radio Ad:
Ken Blackwell is a director of the National Taxpayers Union and
has led efforts to repeal Ohio’s sales tax increase. This is Ohio
Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mom and dad always taught
me to “stick with what you know.” Voting “Yes” on Issue 1, the Ohio
Marriage Amendment, does just that. Some people say Issue 1 will
somehow hurt our state’s economy. But these same people set by
quietly over the past ten years as Ohio government spending
increased by more than 70%. And I didn’t hear a peep from them last
summer while state government passed the largest tax increase in our
state’s history. And now they want us to believe that marriage, the
way we’ve always known it, will somehow hurt our economy. Here’s
what I know. Bad politics hurts our economy, not marriage. Let’s
stick with what we know to be right. I’m Ken Blackwell. For the
future of Ohio, vote “Yes” on Issue 1, Ohio’s Marriage Amendment.
Transcript of “BothWays” Radio Ad:
This is Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mom and dad
always taught me that you can’t have it both ways. Voting “Yes” on
Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage Amendment, simply affirms that. Some
folks have yet to learn that, especially politicians who say they’re
opposed to same-sex marriage, but will not support Issue 1. Why?
Because they want to have it both ways. Every major social science
study tells us time and again: families are stronger with a wife and a
husband; children do better with a mother and a father. That’s why
marriage is the building block of society, and why government’s grant
benefits based on that. We just can’t have it both ways. Marriage is
between one man and one woman. And we should only give the
benefits of marriage to those who are actually married. So vote “Yes”
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on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Let’s go with what we
know is right. I’m Ken Blackwell. For the future of Ohio, vote “Yes”
on Issue 1.
Transcript of “CommonSense” Radio Ad:
This is Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mother and
father taught me many things. But one of the most important was to
use common sense. Voting “Yes” on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage
Amendment, is just common sense. Ohio families are stronger with a
wife and a husband. Our children do better with a mother and a father.
That’s just common sense. It’s clear that we don’t have a future
unless moms and dads have children. That’s why marriage is between
a man and a woman. Just as God created it. And why governments
have recognized it for thousands of years. So protecting marriage is
really just common sense. So on November the second vote “Yes” on
Issue 1, and protect marriage between one man and one woman.
Some call Issue 1 the “Marriage Protection Act.” I like to call it the
“Common Sense Protection Act.” Either way it’s a great idea. I’m
Ken Blackwell. For the future of Ohio, vote “Yes” on Issue 1.
Transcript of “Respect” Radio Ad:
This is Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mom and dad
taught me a great deal about respect. How each individual is one of
God’s unique creations. How they deserve respect, even when you
may disagree with them. Voting “Yes” on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage
Amendment, does just that. Voting “Yes” on Issue 1 keeps marriage
as God created it, between one man and one woman. Some
homosexual activists say that doesn’t respect them. I disagree. The
Bible teaches me to love my neighbor, regardless of their lifestyle.
But it also teaches me to never compromise the truth. If you respect
others you’ll always tell them the truth. Ken Blackwell has twice been
awarded the State Department Superior Honor Award for his human
rights work. Please join him in voting “Yes” on Issue 1. Voting “Yes”
on Issue 1 shows respect for marriage. This is Ken Blackwell. For the
future of Ohio, vote “Yes” on Issue 1.
All of the radio and television transcripts can be found at:
Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, Legal Issues & News,
http://www.ohiomarriage.com/Legal_Issues_&_News.shtml
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2010) (on file with author).
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APPENDIX C:
PRIVATE LIFE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT
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APPENDIX D:
PRIVATE LIFE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT TEXT
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APPENDIX E:
COMMON SENSE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT
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APPENDIX F:
COMMON SENSE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT TEXT
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APPENDIX G:
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